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The Quest for Order in World Politics

I. William Zartman

It does not take much to see that the world is without form, and void, and darkness is on the face of the earth (Genesis 1:2). The Manichaean certainty of the Cold War as a system of world order is gone, and with it one of the two superpowers that held each other in check. Some mourn its passing and find new challenge from new forces of evil, now colored green instead of red. Others see a clash of many colors. But these colorful nightmares tell us little about the shape of the world and the distribution of power within it. After a suitable mourning period for a time when friends and enemies were easily identified and power was measured in isotopic abilities to overkill, it is time to take stock of the new shape of the world, as it stands now and in the foreseeable future.

In this book, eleven authorities on international relations from the United States and beyond have assumed this challenge. The object they observe is seen quite differently by each, even though it bears similarities for all of them. Their visions enrich the debate while at the same time identifying a number of common elements that indisputably form the world on which we sit. Their combined visions also leave a number of uncertainties and loose ends to pursue as the world moves on and the debate clarifies.

Systems of World Order

The buildup and breakdown of order are the basic subjects of political analysis, but they are particularly topical now that the old millennium has crashed in disorder. The search for order is the sign of our times. Both in the world system of states and in the sovereign systems within states, order has broken down, raising challenges to analysis and action. The earlier systems of world order in the twentieth century—the colonial order and the bipolar order—were structured on conquest and conflict, but these orders have dis-
solved, yielding place to uncertainty. The successor system is not yet evi-
dent, and attempts to order interstate relations through such diverse and
conflicting concepts as international organization, uni- or multipolarity,
transnational regimes, competing culture blocs, or a North-South divide
remain inconclusive.¹ Nor is it evident whether the state system rights itself
on its own, responding to the accidents of its own structure, or whether
agents and policies are required to put the pieces into proper places. Is
imbalance stable, or is an equilibrium required?

What has arisen out of this primeval disorder after the epic struggle
between the “forces of good and evil” is a primus inter pares, a hegemonic
firmament that wavers between a leadership role of world order through
conflict management and cooperation on the one hand and a mission aspira-
tion of world order through inspiration and imposition on the other. Yet nei-
ther of these views of its role has yet provoked the balance-of-power reac-
tion from other states that rising hegemons are supposed to trigger. The only
putative balancer has been an atavistic reaction to change, rising against the
state order, cultural impingement, and economic globalization, in the name
of a religious call (da’wa) deemed immutable.

Similarly, the concept of the state as the highest form of political
organization is undergoing tremendous changes, proving its vulnerability
to transnational penetration; interlinking domestic forces; and internation-
al regimes, laws, and organizations. The concept of sovereignty has been
called into question by the secretaries-general of the United Nations them-
selves.² But at the same time the riddled state is expected to regulate more
aspects of human activity than ever before while guarding against state
and nonstate destabilizers. Extreme forms of authoritarian order, as in
apartheid systems in the third world and totalitarian systems in the Second,
have given way to institutionalized participation that is unable to preserve
order. Some states end up with such a high degree of concentrated power
that they implode, consuming the collapsed state and its fragments in their
disorder.³

Conflict is not necessarily chaos, any more than disorder is the opposite
of any particular form of order. Order appears in many, often ostensibly
opposite forms: conflict and cooperation, war and peace, liberty and securi-
ty, oppression and justice, symmetry and asymmetry, and indeed in many
other concepts and values found in the chapters in this collection. Moreover,
order is what permits inquiry and analysis in any discipline, as it turns data
into knowledge; science looks for regularities or orders in events so that
theory can serve “to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena
which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.”⁴ Thus,
inquiry into the concept of world order needs to begin with a search for tax-
onomies of order, in order to address both analytical questions of cause and
relationship and normative questions of purpose and preference.
The Concept of Order

Unlike many other concepts of political (and other social) science, the concept of “order” and its meaning do not divide the discipline into great definitional debates. “Order—peaceful coexistence under conditions of scarcity—,” wrote Talcott Parsons and Edward Shills, “is one of the very first of the functions imperatives of social systems.” Stephen Krasner apparently initially justified his inquiry into regimes as “related to the most fundamental concern of social theory: how is order established, maintained and destroyed,” although the most fundamental concern disappeared in the final version, except in Susan Strange’s recounting to question it. Order implies a relationship among items based on some principle. It often carries a suggestion of or is even used synonymously with harmony or stability, as in Saint Augustine’s definition, “the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place,” or in a common parental injunction, “Johnny, go put some order in your room.” There is therefore, almost unavoidably, a value attached to order, as something the study of politics seeks to discern and the practice of politics seeks to achieve. Ivorian president Félix Houphouet-Boigny quoted Johann Wolfgang von Goethe here, “I prefer injustice to disorder: One can die of disorder, one does not die of injustice,” and after his (natural) death his country proved the point.

In its broadest sense, then, order is all understanding, or at least all political understanding, and politics is the search for order. Inevitably, inherently, therefore, when an incumbent system of world order breaks down, as did the bipolar system of the Cold War, and particularly when it breaks down without a predesignated successor, the component pieces engage in a search for a new order. And since they seek not just any order, but order on the global level, that search is purposeful even if not explicit, intense even if not deadly, involving power even if not violent; the search itself serves as part of the new order and its characteristics.

There are four types of decisionmaking procedures that define how order in a society is achieved. The fundamental typology is based on the type of decisionmaking procedures, which, although mixed in reality, are limited in number in their pure form: (1) authoritative, commanded from the top of a hierarchical structure, whether executive or judicial, imperial or hegemonic; (2) coalitional, composed of subgroups of shifting size in which the largest or strongest part decides for the whole, the most common forms of which are alliance-related and democratic (depending on whether the component unit is a state or a person); (3) negotiated, composed of formally equal subgroups operating under the unanimity or unit veto rule, as in international organizations and national institutions; and (4) inherent or spontaneous, run by the hidden hand of some external agency or inner force such as the market.
As happens when clear concepts meet the real world, the current international order is a bit of all of the above. Another typology often invoked draws on the relation among the component units, depending on whether they are equal or unequal and whether their relationship is therefore symmetrical or asymmetrical. Yet, in reality there is no equality in international (or probably any political) relations, although this fact is generally at odds with the legal fiction of interstate equality.

Although the concern of this book lies in the international field, the world order system is composed of state units whose domestic orders are relevant to the shape of the global whole. It may be reassuring, or at least hopeful, that democracies do not fight each other, as subsequent chapters discuss (and generally accept), but other systems do, and democracies fight them too, as just one example of the intrastate-interstate linkage.

**Power and Order**

Most important for this inquiry is the relationship between power and order. For all its definitional uncertainties, power is the central concept of political science and also the cause of order, whether exercised in authority, coalition, negotiation, or more automatic dynamics. “Politics for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within states,” Max Weber averred. The fact that that distribution is always asymmetrical to some degree provides the dynamics of politics, within as well as between states. “Inferiors become revolutionaries in order to be equals,” Aristotle wrote; “and equals in order to be superiors.” Power provides the structure for world order, as order is the structure for power.

The two prominent notions of power—as a relation or as a possession—are linked but also underlie some diametrically opposite understandings. The first notion, power as a relation, is ex post and conclusionary; it can be appreciated only after an event has taken place, and it is dependent on an outcome of an encounter. As a result, it can be added up over time, but is only grossly predictive and specifically inaccurate. More broadly, it is actor-oriented, dependent on the user’s will and skill. The second notion, power as a possession, is ex ante and anticipatory; it can be calculated before any interaction, and it assumes (wrongly) that aggregate sources always produce identifiable outcomes. (Common components of power as a possession are shown in Table 1.1.) This notion reads results into structure and subordinates freedom (or at least wisdom) of choice to its structures. Nigeria and South Africa do not (often?) get their way in Africa, where they are the 900-pound gorillas of their continent. Thus, to assume a coincidence between the two notions of power is inaccurate: The United States does not always...
get its way either, although it is the 9,000-pound gorilla on the world scene. But the debate remains over how often, in what instances, in what way, and with what freedom of policy choice it does get its way.

The next question concerns the way one arrives at a particular order, a matter of importance under system or regime change, whether in the international system mutating from bipolar coalitions to unipolar hegemony or multipolar pluralism or in domestic polities in transition (from authoritarian order presumably to democracy). The domestic question has occasioned a vigorous literature pointing to the importance of power holders negotiating pacts to retain protection, if not position, in the transition. Analysis of the evolution of the international system is limited by the uniqueness of the current case, the only instance of system change without a major war. The United States arrived at a hegemonic position through the exercise of its enormous economic power, and demonstrated to the Soviet leaders their

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<td><strong>Gross Domestic Power/Capita</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Iron + Steel Production</strong></td>
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<td>141.3</td>
<td>290.9&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>2,445</td>
<td>2,602</td>
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*Notes:* a. The SIPRI data set is converted into constant 2000 US$ using average market exchange rates rather than purchasing power parity conversion rates. This significantly understates military expenditure in some countries, especially developing economies such as China and Russia. See the SIPRI website at http://projects.sipri.org/miles/mex_sources.html for details.

b. Federal Republic of Germany.

c. 78.5 million including German Democratic Republic.

d. USSR.
e. Russia.
futile pursuit of a confrontation in technological revolutions and military procurement; the latter preferred the consequences of fatigue to suicidal war. The hegemon now finds itself in a predominant position in which its power (as a possession)—its gross domestic power in Seyom Brown’s term—is unable to accomplish its goals (as a relationship); hence, its best course of leadership is to assert its power by restraining it, as subsequent chapters indicate, a central question within this book underlying most chapters but addressed directly by Robert Jervis in Chapter 3. What then is power, and what is the order built on it?

Earlier debates over bipolar versus multipolar stability in international politics have turned into a debate over hegemony versus multipolarity, and the ongoing debate over the importance of a hegemon versus a middle power coalition for regional integration and international cooperation continues into the new world order. Although the verdict seems to have tilted in favor of bipolarity and then hegemony over multipolarity as the key to stability, there is a tinge of argument to please the court or acquiescence to the current order of things in the analysis. Unfortunately, a deeper but less satisfying conclusion is, arguably, that any of the three orders is stable if it is played “right”: that is, each order contains stability mechanisms of mutual restraint whose use depends on the dominant parties’ sense of responsibility (to maintain stability!) and not on any inherent homeostasis. To identify unilateral philosopher kings, bilateral regimes, and the multilateral balance of power as such mechanisms confirms the need for a place for will and skill in political analysis, along with more objective mechanisms and regularities. Such mechanisms offer structural possibilities, but they are not automatic and require will on the part of the agent and skill in the necessary processes to operate.

Although developed polities in general have worked out their institutional structures, developing countries continue to debate the effects of a centralized, if not authoritarian, power structure versus a pluralistic system, whether parliamentarian or dual executive. The most notable enactment of this debate occurred in the early 1990s in the twelve countries of Africa where civil society made the extraordinary move of seizing sovereignty from the authoritarian incumbent in sovereign national conferences (SNC) and drawing up a new social contract. The same question faces other countries in Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America that feel the same desire for transition from authoritarian rule, even without a SNC. An authoritative order faces the challenge of keeping the father of the nation dynamic and honest, whereas the coalitional order faces the challenges of keeping the coalition stable or the great coalition honest and dynamic, and the negotiated order faces the challenge of participation, recognizing both those who are part of the problem and those who are not part of the problem as legitimate parts of the solution.
Even though democracy is without exception the favored solution to the power-and-order problem, it is used to justify truly democratic, democratizing, and undemocratic orders, and its inevitable abuses and inefficiencies return the analysis to focus on remedies for problems of effectiveness and responsibility. By the same token, its remedial insignificance on the domestic level should give pause to those who would seek to create a “democratic” international order, as Gustav Schmidt discusses below, whether with states or with populations as the component units, where equivalent remedies have yet to be invented, as well as to those who look to democracy without preparation as a quick fix, either from within or from without.

The millennium brought a startling—or refreshing—new angle to the problem of power orders by introducing the prospects of weakened states facing an increasing number of challenges. In internal politics, the need for the state, whatever its power structure, to rely increasingly on cooperation with nonstate actors returns to prominence the concept of civil society as a crucial element in the internal order and an answer to the problems of effectiveness and responsibility. International politics has already begun to grapple, still inconclusively, with the problem of permeable and circumvented sovereignty weakening the fiber of its state system. It also increasingly recognizes the role of nongovernmental organizations in preparing, supporting, and implementing state initiatives. As a result, negotiation—rather than authority or coalition democracy—has become paramount as the decision-making order within the networks, dialogues, regimes, and outsourcing that are needed to tie the pieces together. The state has come back as the heart of political analysis, just in time for the body politic to be subject to invasive surgery and bypasses to overcome its sclerosis. Thus state building (the correct translation of the misused term “nation building”) has again resurfaced as a major link in the rise of the nonstate challengers to the state system and a major challenge to the leaders of the world order system, whether for missional or structural reasons, as Gustav Schmidt discusses in Chapter 7.

**The Orders of the Day**

Scholarship paces events, as it should (despite the claims of external interference through this relationship). After all, there is more scholarship these days on state collapse or democratization than on revolution or monarchy, more on multipolarity than on bipolarity: “Transformations of political discourse in the West have been a function of changing conceptualizations of threat to the existence of political order.” Thus, after the collapse of communism and under international anarchy, authoritarian order is generally not at the top of the current agenda for research and debate, whereas the other
three forms of order—democratic coalitions, oligarchic negotiation, and inherent, automatic orders—have produced new analysis and concerns. The assertive policy of the United States in the early 2000s restored concern and debate about authoritarian order, if only to put it into perspective.

Order through hierarchy is doubtless the oldest type, but the divine right of kings has passed into history in most places. Even as late as Talleyrand and the rest of the nineteenth century, it was the source of legitimacy in Europe, and in Africa and the Middle East it still is, whether heredity or coup is the source of incumbency. Even democratic systems have retained strong executive institutions, although they are usually balanced by legislatures and (authoritarian) judiciaries in a separation of powers, or checks and balances. Such balancing is characteristic of international orders, global or regional, as will be discussed next, because by definition they exist in international anarchy (i.e., leaderlessness), the very characteristic that makes assertions of leadership tempting for a great power. It is because of this definitional characteristic that unipolarity and too ostentatious assertions of hegemony are viewed with disapproval by other members of the system, and also because no one likes to be an inferior. A second, more focused level of objections derives from the fact that the authoritative state and the others are certain not to share all the same interests, and indeed to possess certain opposite interests because of their positions, a subject of analysis by Kenneth Waltz in Chapter 2 and Charles Doran in Chapter 5. Efforts by the central power to assert a total commonality of interests can only go so far. So hierarchy alone is not the source of order, and it is essential to recognize that the United States (to name names) does not consistently, or even frequently, prevail. Indeed, the current concern is not that the United States will lead the pack but that it will ignore it, scarcely a form of hierarchical order.

Order through coalition has received new emphasis in current concerns about the process of democratization and the evidence that previously non-democratic orders of governance lack the coalitional fluidity necessary for their immediate transformation into democratic orders. Balance becomes the source of order; a statesman “must perpetuate order, which he does by keeping the multitudinous aggressions of men in balance against one another,” Jacques Barzun maintains, echoing Bagehot and Talleyrand. In international politics, order based on the coalition process is an established tradition. The basic mechanism involving a flexible coalition of states wanting to preserve the status quo against a rising hegemon, known as the balance of power or, more recently, balance of threat, is still central to international relations theory, although the concept of power has evolved, as discussed below. If half a century of bipolarity took some of the flexibility out of coalition behavior, both within and among the blocs, two decades of post-bipolar uncertainties have not produced the antihegemonic coalition against
the remaining superpower that the theory might have predicted, as Kenneth Waltz points out, probably because the hegemon’s political yoke is easy, its economic burden is lightened by a lot of free riding, and its values are widely shared, as Seyom Brown indicates below. US language and behavior, particularly in the first Bush administration of the 2000s, weakened these restraints, leaving much fence mending for the second term and its successors.

In the process, the opposite coalition behaviors of bandwagoning and balking have also come to light as an attractive alternative, particularly for small states. Another new extension has been the analysis of regime building and multilateral diplomacy, theoretically quite different from the generally assumed bilateral character of negotiation, as a matter of managing complexity through coalition. Although basic coalition theory dates from an earlier era, these new uses of the concept have broken out from the simpler assumptions of that theory and require further theoretical expansion and then testing.

Yet even in established democratic orders, ascriptive components such as ethnicity and gender pose problems of voter rigidity. The result is that democracy is no longer analyzed with the primary focus on the individual voter, as in earlier studies, but on aggregated votes. Analysts have repeatedly and variously noted that the presumed egalitarian status necessary for free choice by individual voters is negated by the inegalitarian status of the ascriptive blocs to which they belong and also by status effects on attitudes, participation, and choice, bringing a reexamination of the new relevance of classical solutions to both aspects of the rigidity problem, ranging from proportional representation to gerrymandering.

The rigidity problem has led to other avenues of analysis. The issue of preconditions to democracy is being reexamined. Either socioeconomic development to higher levels of literacy and productivity or economic reform to pluralist economic competition is claimed by some to be a necessary antecedent to competitive political pluralism. Passage from an authoritarian to a democratic order is found to require a negotiated transition of elite pacts to avoid a replication of the authoritarian bloc under new conditions. Ethnic voting blocs must be broken by crosscutting, interest-aggregating parties to avoid the creation of permanent ethnic majorities, yet political parties tend to become vehicles for ethnic voting blocs. As scholars come to the conclusion that there is no best form of democratic constitution, research on democratization devolves into the “puzzle phase” as its focus is drawn to transitional institutional structures, voting regulations and practices, transparency guarantees, and postelectoral implementation. The flaws of simple majoritarian systems are receiving greater emphasis as democracy, at its best, comes to be seen as a coalition process in which all have a share in power.
Negotiated orders were the subject of an enormous burst of attention and analysis in the last decades of the previous millennium. Negotiation has been characterized as involving “an initial disorder—the dispute—and an endeavor to reach an order—the settlement.” It has long been studied in the uninstitutionalized order of international relations, leaving coalition and authority and their variants as the contending systems of order for domestic politics. If there are signal dates in the real world for a new focus on negotiation, they come from the 1960s—between 1962 in international relations, when the Cuban missile crisis turned superpower military confrontation to diplomatic bargaining, and 1968 in domestic relations, when youth around the world refusing authority sought to negotiate new realities. It was also the time of seminal works that launched the analysis of a form of order different from the others—neither commanded nor divided but based on unanimity between and among formally equal parties about a constructed outcome. The new attention has opened an entirely new area of analysis untouched in previous accounts that dealt only with outcomes—bills, treaties, institutions, states, constitutions—while ignoring the way in which they were achieved.

Negotiated orders have a participatory legitimacy and ownership shared with voted orders but without the necessary losers, and the negotiated order’s threefold choice (accept, reject, continue) allows for a positive-sum creativity that the twofold choice of voting and the “no-choice” acceptance of authority do not provide. Negotiation, however, requires recognition of the parties’ legitimacy, an ability to accept half a loaf, and a tolerance of ambiguity in decisions that some situations do not permit. Without the tools of negotiation analysis, it would not be possible to investigate many aspects of world and domestic order such as international regimes, labor-management relations, peacemaking and peacekeeping, business deals, and preparation of legislation; yet it is significant that these very issue-areas are the ones where much remains to be done and learned about negotiation.

Thus negotiation can be treated as both a dependent and an independent variable in the search for order. Two questions dominate: “What is the order inherent in or leading to negotiation?” and “What kind of order does negotiation produce?” Negotiation processes follow one of three patterns (or a mix of them): concession/convergence distributive bargaining, which produces zero-sum (“win/lose”) outcomes; compensating exchange trading, which produces positive-sum (“win/win”) outcomes; or formula/detail integrating construction, which also produces positive-sum (“win/win”) outcomes. There is a high correlation of process to outcome, but the determinants of the initial choice are not yet clear.
Among the three, compensating exchanges and integrating construction produce more stable outcomes since distributive bargaining contains an incentive for later rejection by the losing party—Farhang Rajaee’s “politics of deliberation and inclusion.” Compared to other types of order, institutionalized negotiation orders such as consensus legislation, international regimes, civil society groups, pacted transitions, and institutional amendments, among others, tend to be more creative, more flexible, and more able to handle change. Compared to other types of order, institutionalized negotiation orders such as consensus legislation, international regimes, civil society groups, pacted transitions, and institutional amendments, among others, tend to be more creative, more flexible, and more able to handle change.48 Recent work has reinforced the conclusion that elected orders confirm legitimacy but only as a prerequisite, and that the real work of satisfying cross-cutting majorities and minorities through effective governance is produced by negotiations among the elected parties and their appointed agents.49

Most recently, spurred by approaches in other sciences, a new type of order has begun to receive attention, the *spontaneous or inherent order*, or the political equivalent of the market.50 International political analysts have long claimed the balance-of-power mechanism to be not a policy option but an automatic pattern into which states’ actions fall, although uncertainty remains as to whether it is indeed an automatic effect or a voluntary policy coalition (including a balancer).51 Structuralists, as expressed in Chapter 2 by Kenneth Waltz, see a determinism over policy and role in the power distribution of the system. Social scientists and philosophers have long sought an elegant explanation for order in the form of a natural, self-maintaining equilibrium, but in the postwar era, they have asserted but then disclaimed the homeostatic tendencies of social systems.

Rational choice analysis carries something of an inherent order mechanism under its innocent assumption of rationality, not surprising since rational choice is putatively the political equivalent of market economics (realist theory is less convincing in the same claim in international politics).52 However, the proposal that the political system (state or international system) is the equivalent of the market, larger than the sum of the parts of rational political actors, does not provide the same convincing insights and has already been co-opted and worn out (if not discredited) by the twentieth century’s emphasis on raison d’état, *Staatsmacht*, and eventually the totalitarian state, and the post–World War II recurrent emphasis on world reformist missions. The millennial search continues for a political order that has its own regularities and mechanisms and can be subjected to scientific theory and analysis, independent of the vagaries of human choice.

In the forms of order—coalition, negotiation, the political equivalent of the market, leaving empire aside—the potential is still underdeveloped. Coalition theory has not kept up with its application; negotiation theory is still a matter of many different views of the elephant; and theorists are still searching for the political equivalent of the market.54 Whether in domestic
legislation or diplomatic mandate, coalitions are best subject to theoretical analysis when their components qualify as constituted units with well-determined interests and positions. But when their interests are inchoate and their existence itself the subject of political action, as is most usually the case, even the best analysis becomes inductive or ad hoc. Similarly, negotiation analysis has long been based on an assumption of established positions, bottom lines, and concession/convergence behavior, conditions that allow elegant theory but omit most of the negotiation process and conceive it in unrealistic terms. The political “market” too can only be a process. Important conceptualizations of a political system as a mechanism with explicable and foreseeable consequences, developed in the 1950s and 1960s, have been put on the shelf for the moment, ready for retrieval in response to new questions and new bursts of inspiration.

**Concerns About Order**

The relation of power to order sets up a further agenda of concerns, some having to do with the dynamics of putative opposites, such as the relation between order and change, and others with supposed synonyms, such as order and justice, or order and legitimacy, or order and law. None is new (what is, in political theory?) but all are of particular concern for the state of world order at the outset of the millennium.

The relation between order and change is a continuing concern that the end of the Cold War order has thrown into new prominence, and is taken up in Chapter 4 by Paul Schroeder and Chapter 5 by Charles Doran. Order is not the opposite of change: There is orderly change and the change of orders, as in patterns (or anatomies) of revolution, stages of development, measures of transition, and amendment of constitutions. Thus, the eternal question regarding the relationship between order and change takes on two meanings: the scientist looks for regularities in new clusters of events, the practitioner (including the victim) looks for orderly—that is, if not nonviolent, at least predictable—change.

New subjects of attention for interpretative scholarship on change and order for the beginning of the millennium include interstate systemic transformation, transitions from one type of world order to another, and state collapse. In international politics, the inability of realist theory to explain, let alone predict, the collapse of the bipolar system and the avenues of its succession has raised penetrating questions about its theoretical power and defensive answers about its constrained applicability. In the now-merging areas of interstate and intrastate conflict, the search for nonviolent change has led to the new field of conflict management, resolution, and transforma-
tion, which enables investigation of patterns of conflict and ways of channeling violent conflicts into political interaction. Indeed, government itself is conflict management, providing an orderly process of change and mechanism for handling conflict among legitimate demands (and resources) and controlling its potential escalation into violence. The hegemonic order, like past systems of world order, finds itself torn between selective goals of domestic regime change and regime support against change.

Justice is not necessarily order; any more than is peace or mercy. Orders are likely to be overtaken by the struggle for justice if they do not already achieve it (Goethe and Houphouet-Boigny notwithstanding), but since the bases of justice themselves change over time, today’s just order may be tomorrow’s cause for revolt. International politics has looked for order in justice and justice in order on different occasions, for example, as rival organizations seek “peace” versus “peace with justice” in the Middle East. The relationship between order and justice is the subject of Chapter 8 by Farhang Rajaei. Yet neither on the ground nor in the most recent periodic burst of scholarship has a consensual definition of a just order that can stand up to the inevitable changes in criteria been established. For all the travesties that it perpetrated on humanity, communism began as a search for a just order, but order soon became its own criterion, overriding justice, both in its domestic polities and in its regional system. In the case of fundamentalist religious orders (especially Islamist ones), justice is cited as the motivating factor in the imposition of an authoritarian system, with the same inherent deformation as already seen under communism. Whereas after the Cold War the weak hegemonic order may be criticized more for its ineptitude in the pursuit of justice, the Islamist reaction takes on the injustice of the order itself. Since the defeat of world communism and the confrontation with Islamic fundamentalism, democracy has been frequently touted as the way to a just order, although the question plagues the current confrontation as it did the earlier one: Where is justice if the democratic order produces an antidemocratic system?

Order and legitimacy are distinct terms, so that “legitimate order” is not a redundancy, any more than the might that makes order makes that order right. Legitimacy, defined as “the right to rule,” can only refer to domestic political orders, where rule occurs and where the analysis asks whether the reigning domestic order is indeed legitimate and how legitimacy is determined. There is still no internal answer, despite some sophisticated polling techniques and rational choice analyses; legitimacy is generally judged from the outside, as commentators look in, and is often distinguished from “legal,” the internal measure. The current criterion for awarding legitimacy, both within states and within the international institutions of world order that they comprise, is the presence of democracy, often elusive to definition.
and discovery. Yet order and legitimacy are not totally independent of each other: Legitimacy contributes to order, but order contributes to its own legitimacy.

In the anarchic international order, legitimacy needs a new definition, perhaps referring instead to the order’s right to exist, if not back to the concept of justice itself. In the absence of a direct determination, which is more applicable in domestic polities, investigations relating to legitimacy in an international order necessarily involve questions about the process of its establishment, the allocation of its benefits, and the balance of benefits and responsibilities (see Chapter 5 by Charles Doran and Chapter 10 by Francis Fukuyama). As with justice, the question is not raised about the legitimacy of the hegemonic order but rather about the uses to which that hegemony is put.

The relation between order and law is less treated in the current debate. In the late 1960s, “law and order” became the designation of the right, the forces against change. For Weber, “The political element consists, above all, in the task of maintaining ‘law and order’ in the country, hence maintaining the existing power relations.” In domestic relations, law is roughly synonymous with order, despite the ideological appropriations of the phrase, but the heated debate is over how much of public and private life needs to be ordered by law. While the provision of private socioeconomic security from the cradle to the grave has been somewhat reduced in many countries, legal regulation of everything from abortion to zebra mussels is viewed by many as overly intrusive and sparks a conservative call for “less government.” The answer for many is found in John Locke’s assertion of civil society as an order without authority, with the players capable of regulating their own affairs without invoking Hobbes’s Leviathan, but the relation between the two—the subsidiarity question—is unclear: Is law needed to regulate what civil society does not, or is civil society needed to regulate what law does not? Yet civil society is an increasingly important subject of inquiry, particularly in regard to the developing countries, where the problem is an alternative not to intrusive government but to lame or privatized government.

In international politics, where there is practically no government at all, the same question is the basis of the dispute between the realists and the liberals over how anarchic the international order is and to what extent state “behaviors” are constrained by regimes, that is, by soft law, institutions, or “principles, norms, rules and procedures.” The debate is partially definitional, although the liberal school is better equipped to explain cooperation than its opponent, which is more attuned to conflict. The two also split over law’s application in the current asymmetric world order, as highlighted by Gustav Schmidt in Chapter 7: Are the hegemonic law enforcers subject to the same laws, however soft, as the rest of the international community?
The Universality of Order

It is hard to imagine that any of these concerns could be limited to a particular cultural area of the globalized world or would be a worry to only a Western mind. Order itself is universal, and its forms are limited. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and none is the cultural property of any particular country or region. There may be (or may have been) a Confucian order in China, an Islamic order in Iran, an Enarquic order in France, or a monarchial order in Morocco, but the concept of order is common to them all, and their peculiar characteristics can also be found here and there around the globe. It is hard to compare, analyze, talk of them, or combine them in a global system without using common concepts of order.

Nonetheless, political culture would aver that particular conceptions of order dominate the ethos and practice of large world areas, based on current political systems, historical traditions, predominant religions, and regional configurations, an analysis that both Gustav Schmidt and Farhang Rajaee develop in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. From this point of view (admittedly generalized and perhaps caricatured), Asia—both East or Confucian and Western or Arabo-Muslim—can be said to favor a centralized, hierarchic political order, as contrasted with the Judeo-Christian Atlantic West, which is characterized by a pluralized competitive order. China and Egypt would be typical of the first; the United States and Europe of the second. The Confucian system dominant in China (and reinforced by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology) regards hierarchy as superior to competition as an ordering principle, and enlightened authoritarian command is its form of decisionmaking. A deeply inbred fear of social chaos (luan) preconditions the Chinese preference for a strong central authority. A strong government is also perceived to be better able to deliver public goods. Its political geography has long been seen in terms of concentric circles, based on the pivotal Middle Kingdom, and indeed the vast country of China has one time zone. Values are in service of the collective and emphasize communal harmony. Foreigners are held separate, socialization into dominant cultural patterns is the main function of education, and political participation is through the single party. Negotiation becomes difficult to practice, and instructive discourse is preferred. Yet on the interstate level, competition is vigorously engaged, state sovereignty strongly defended, and regional autonomy actively asserted, yielding a nonhierarchical and antihegemonic worldview.

Despite very different sources, Arabo-Muslim political culture has remarkably similar characteristics, as seen in Egypt and most other Arab countries. The authoritarian system centered around the leader (za'im) is predominant, the single party or at least the dominant party runs the political system, and democracy has a hard time taking hold. If the Arab world is broken up into separate states, the Arab nation and the single Islamic com-
Community (umma) are idealized and mythologized, and the classical language of the Quran is the standard of civilization and the word of God (al-Lah). Egypt is the Mother of the Earth (masr umm al-duniya), even if some other Arab states would claim at least paternity. Out of this culture comes the most important current version of the balance of power, a nonstate protest movement that seeks to stop the globalizing world and get off, to return to its own imposed view of orthodoxy. Its nonstate form reflects the nonstate form of globalization and its hydra-formed organization responds to the hegemonic structure of the world order system. Yet it is also an antipluralizing movement, attaching corrupt Muslim governments in the name of Sunni atavism and a return to a golden age. Although in both East and West Asia pluralism is bound to exist, it is conditioned and contained within the centralized authoritarian order.

In contrast, the Atlantic West is characterized by competitive pluralism, multiparty democracy, a multicultural stew in the melting pot, and many time zones. The United States is no more united than its federalism will allow, and European unity takes place only by preserving its multistate system. Where pluralism has to be contained, it is done through binary logic, Manichaean conceptualization between good and bad, black and white, and legal confrontation. France invented and the United States applied the separation of powers within government, and this pluralism has been paralleled historically by the richness of American associational life in civil society. Even where the European monarchial tradition has left a shadow of centralism, it has been eaten away at the edges throughout history by the English barons, German states, Italian (even including papal) tolerance for ambiguity, and French republicanism. This is a negotiated polity par excellence, combined with the elections and coalitions of democracy. Little wonder that the balance-of-power practice and theory came out of this type of state system.

These vignettes can be either dismissed as caricatures or endlessly debated and diagnosed as clashing civilizations, as can no doubt the whole area of political (or any other) culture. Yet there is a lot of literature and discussion behind the general picture of the three cultures that the vignettes present, and they represent a certain consensus about different notions of order in different parts of the world, even in their abbreviated form. From this point of view, it can be argued that there is a dominant pattern of expectations and discourse about appropriate orders in various parts of the world, whatever the exceptions and blurred edges that might exist.

The overriding point, of course, is that these images reflect a common notion of the meaning of order and of the forms it can take, even if elements in that universal typology find different supporting examples from different regions. These different views of the same elephant combine into a single system of world order, larger than the sum of its diverse parts, in which they must find a role, whatever they do at home. In response to the original ques-
tions, different regions may answer differently as to which order is preferable, but they enter into the debate on the basis of a common understanding of the orders possible and practiced among massive human collectivities on this earth.

Hegemony and Order

The following chapters join in this debate from nine different points of view. They identify the current system of world order and the position of the United States in it, and in so doing identify its weaknesses and dangers as well as its strengths. To some, the marking characteristic is US hegemony, which determines the type of international order. To others, it is the order itself, larger than the sum of its parts, that determines the role of its components, including the United States. Although the separation between these two approaches is not neat and their overlap is great, this difference in emphasis has been used to divide the analyses into two parts in the following presentation.

Yet each of these approaches is driven by a larger argument over the relation between structure and policy. To some, in both approaches, it is the structure of relations that determines the policies of the component parts, who do only what they can do given their place in the system, whereas to others, states have a wider range of policy choices that determine the structure of the world order system. As in the previous dichotomy, the distinction between the two is not hermetic, and they tend to meet each other coming and going. In fact, as often in purportedly sharp academic debates, the argument is circular, and its two sides are complementary: Where you sit depends to a large extent on where you get on the train. Structure is the result of component elements’ choices, which are in turn limited by their place in the structure. The analysis could be termed structural possibilism, in a recognition that human choice cannot be contained in any determinism but is free to exhibit brilliant inventiveness as well as stupid mistakes, in addition to predominant regularities.80

The four chapters in the first part of the book focus on US hegemony in the international order. The first two chapters center their analyses on the concept of power and its operation within the system of world order. Starting from the fact of US predominance, Kenneth Waltz shows how the hegemon will adopt dominant policies, although it has a choice between preemption, on the one hand, and deterrence and containment, on the other. Faced with the hegemon, the others will seek to keep it in check. Yet, they will be ineffective for the very reason that impelled their attempt at balancing. Robert Jervis, in Chapter 3, is not so sure. In a world order characterized by both wars and security communities, hegemonic policies are inher-
ent in the position of the predominant state. Such policies are understand-
ably inherent in the international power structure, but they are not
inevitable. Structure need not preempt choice, and indeed the feedback from
the choice of prevention (or rather preemption) over deterrence has a pro-
found effect on the next round of choice.

The next pair of chapters emphasizes the importance of choice over
structure from very different angles. Both, like the preceding pair of
authors, see the urge to domination inherent in the US position of power. In
Chapter 4, historian Paul Schroeder examines the historical record to ana-
lyze the policies adopted by predominant states in their choice between
hegemony and empire (loosely construed). Hegemony is equated with lead-
ership in a multiparticipant, even if not multipolar, system, whereas empire
means overextension, exhaustion, and ultimately betrayal of predomi-
nance’s responsibilities. The historical record shows that the outcome of
imperial pursuit is not only policy failure but a return to hegemonic leader-
ship to recoup systemic predominance. The system rights itself at some
cost. In Chapter 5, Charles Doran, a quantitative systems analyst, throws
doubt on the entire notion of hegemony. No actor, no matter how powerful,
is able to impose its policies on the international system, but it can adopt
policies that shorten or prolong its predominant position in the power
cycles. It cannot overwhelm putative balancing coalitions, but it can gather
a coalition around itself, a multilateralism of the willing, that tempers both
the single dominance and the countervailing structure.

The chapters in Part 2 focus on the world order system as the context
for the hegemon, reversing the emphasis of the first part while maintaining
the same elements. In Chapter 6, Seyom Brown sees US hegemony as
embedded in a polyarchic field of actors in competition for resources and
support. Their classically predicted balancing and bandwagoning around the
hegemon is joined by a third policy of balking when the first two become
ineffectual. This array of choices structures the system and leaves the hege-
mon with policy choices of its own (empire, unilateralism, isolationism, and
leadership). In Chapter 7, Gustav Schmidt presents a view from within the
Atlantic security community but from Europe. Separate policy choices, dif-
f erent definitions of security, and special emphases on welfare mean that the
hegemon’s coalition partners have a rising role to play in determining the
ruling order. Their imperfect community also means that the global order is
really a confederation of regional order, a new texture that other analyses
have passed over.

The next two chapters see the international order as one of globaliza-
tion, although again of very different natures. For Farhang Rajaee in
Chapter 8, the global order takes the shape of a no-polar world of nonstate
as well as state players constituting a single multicultural civilization
formed and regulated by the information revolution. Where the previous
state system was dominated by a search for security, the ensuing system is challenged by the demands of justice. As the new order develops, its participants, no longer just states but humanity, face the classical alternatives of tyranny, rebellion, or civility, mirroring choices posed in previous chapters but in a different form. To Michael Klare and Peter Pavilianis in Chapter 9, globalization is characterized instead by a competition for scarce resources, conducted by states for their populations as well as for their own security needs. The structural challenge is constituted by demand outpacing supply, in which the various members of the previously identified orders all face resource inadequacies. Policy choices to avert conflict are technical and specific rather than systemic.

The final window on the unfolding shape of the world is opened by Francis Fukuyama in Chapter 10, who echoes the inadequacy of both an institutionalized order and a counterbalanced unipolar order to deal with characteristic conflict. These conflicts are topped by the dual threat of the ultimate nongovernmental organization, the terrorist balancer of the globalized superpower, and the superempowerment conferred by the potential availability of weapons of mass destruction. The answer, still unfolding, comes in the shape of institutions that contain hegemonic leadership and combine the requirements of legitimacy and power needed for a new and stable system of world order.

The contemporary debate, as it develops in these chapters, is not over differences in the sorts of world order that succeed the Cold War bipolarity or over a competition between regional or cultural models for the global system. The contributors quickly come to agreement over the nature of the hegemonic world order, with some slight disagreement over precisely what name to give it. But thereupon, they debate whether policies and relations within that system are the result of automatic mechanisms of power structures inherent in the hegemonic order, as realism would indicate, or whether they are the result of the goals and ultimately the whims of the hegemonic states and their leaders, framed by normative impulses and institutions as liberals would hope or by public opinion as constructionists aver. Although the answer takes on a partisan as well as an academic tone during presidential campaigns, it is crucial for an understanding of the future, as is the underlying goal of the debate in this collection.

For if the policies of the postbipolar hegemonic era are a structural consequence, there is little leeway (other than rhetorical) in its future. A balance of power among states may eventually materialize, delayed beyond the currently analyzed reasons by the common need to face the nonstate balance of power that brooks no allies and threatens all who ride the tide of globalization. But the opposition of lesser states is merely a structural phenomenon, an occupational hazard; the hegemonic position itself is a lightening pole for envy, cynicism, and jealousy—the Venus Envy Complex. The
hegemon cannot long rely on self-restraint as the mode of its leadership, and its crusades against evil states (before they become empires) for the democratic salvation of their peoples are measures of its stature. The debate, then, is only about verbiage, the packaging, not the content. In this view, ideology (and history) is not banished by realism but is inherent in it. A state’s policies and means are always in balance, as Walter Lippman told us long ago.

But if the policies of the hegemon and the bystanders are actor-determined, the scope for alternatives is wide, even if not boundless, limited only (and enabled) by secondary structural characteristics, by the institutions the actors accept, or by the public opinion they court and shape. The debate in this view is directly about policy directions and about the pursuit or abdication of ideational (or “missionary”) goals offering wide options. These options may include the speed and decisiveness of response to world conflicts, the purposes of power, the choice and use of allies, the use and acceptance of institutions, and the tone of the message from the hegemon. They could also include a shift to a focus on transnational dangers, from disease to terrorism, or a refocus on the implications of new measures of gross national power (such as oil) in the place of power-structural determinism. In this view, realism provides no guide as to what may or even can happen, although liberal institutionalism and constructivism only indicate additional inputs. But the following chapters agree that the options will not include the renunciation of the hegemonic role and the responsibilities that go with it. Such is the nature of the imbalance of power—the ever-uncertain system of world order.

Notes

15. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace.”
21. Gunnar Sjöstedt, “Asymmetry in Multilateral Negotiation Between North and South at UNCED.”
22. Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej, eds., *The Cold War as Cooperation*.
26. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter Evans, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*.
40. T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.
49. Krishna Kumar, *Post-Conflict Elections*.
53. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *The Pathologies of Rational Choice*.
54. Regarding negotiation theory, see the well-known story about the blind wise men who were asked to describe the elephant. Each returned with a simile based on the part of the animal he grabbed (an elephant is a rope, said the tail-grabber; an elephant is a tree, said the leg-holder; an elephant is a hose, said the trunk man; etc), whereupon the king (who could see) said that the elephant is all these things.
Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”; Edward Kolodziej, “The Pursuit of Order, Welfare and Legitimacy.”


64. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; Brian Barry, Theories of Justice; John Elster, Local Justice. See also I. William Zartman et al., “Negotiation as a Search for Justice.”

65. Ahmad Moussalli, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism.

66. Regarding the right to rule, see Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, p. 133; regarding legitimacy, see D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power.

67. Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy.

68. C. von Haldenwang, “The State and Political Regulation.”


72. Stephen Krasner, International Regimes; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes; Bertram Spector and I. William Zartman, Getting It Done.

73. This is the other side of the same coin as discussed by Amartya Sen and not in contradiction with his position; Sen, Development as Freedom, chap 10, esp. pp. 244–248. I am grateful to Guy Olivier Faure of the Sorbonne for useful suggestions in this area.


78. Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique.


80. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Environmental Possibilism.

81. Walter Lippman, US Foreign Policy.