contested internal elections (pp. 120–53). And ultimately — although this is not covered in the book, which ends after Muhammad Morsi’s election to the presidency — the movement was widely accused of failing to govern inclusively, abandoning (according to some) its promises to act in concert with liberals, leftists, seculars, and nationalists.

Wickham’s account of the dynamics and scope of the Brotherhood’s changes is of undeniable importance, and it is why this book is as much a contribution to the literature on political parties as it is to the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt, or political Islam. What the author has done here is to articulate a mechanism for party change that takes ideology and human agency seriously. In her telling, political leaders undergo real processes of value change that are independent of the necessities of winning elections or maintaining the support of party militants. Moreover, the choices of these leaders matter: According to Wickham, whether a hard-line or reformist faction seizes control is not simply a function of what garners the party the most votes but of what politicians do to sway their copartisans. For its challenges to much of the literature on parties and party change, this work should, and will, be read with profit by comparativists of a diversity of methodological stripes and regional focuses.

Although Wickham’s account of the processes of ideological change experienced by Muslim Brotherhood members is highly detailed and utterly convincing, future scholars will no doubt work to build upon, and flesh out, her account of the reason that the reformists in the movement failed to carry the day against the more conservative faction. As we have seen, the author locates the causes of this outcome primarily in the decision of reformists to build bridges to non-Islamists, rather than to focus their efforts internally, but there are alternative mechanisms that might have been at play. One of these mechanisms, advanced by several scholars and observers of the movement, is that the Muslim Brotherhood’s highly selective recruitment methods and regimented organizational practices (documented by Wickham in her agenda-setting 2003 book *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*) generated cadres who were rigid in their adherence to party orthodoxy and unlikely to be hospitable to the minority of reformists who brought back from their encounters with non-Islamists and Westerners new ideas about where the movement should be going.

Yet another alternative mechanism is advanced by Wickham herself, in her excellent comparative chapter on Brotherhood-related movements in Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco (pp. 196–246). According to the author, Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development (PJD) took a path almost the opposite of that taken by the Brotherhood. She tells us that the party “has gone the furthest to downplay its call for shari’a rule and has been the most restrained in pursuit of its conservative social and moral agenda” (p. 231). This, she tells us, “reflects the relative strength of pragmatic and ideologically flexible figures within the group’s leadership ranks” (p. 231). However, she tells us that it also reflects “the presence of secular parties and civil society organizations with sufficient resources and mass support to serve as an effective counterweight to—and constraint upon—the PJD’s power” (p. 231). Those two things are presented as independent causes of the PJD’s pragmatism, but it seems at least possible that one is endogenous to the other. In other words, the ascent of pragmatists in the PJD could have been a function of the fact that the party faced genuine secular challengers who could make it pay a cost at the ballot box for veering too far in the direction of religious purity.

Further support for this alternative hypothesis emerges in the author’s nuanced discussion of postrevolutionary Egypt. Wickham describes a political landscape that was relatively supine before Islamists, as secular parties managed to capture only a handful of seats in the country’s legislature. Instead, she tells us that the Brothers found their main competitors to be even more conservative Salafist parties, whose commitment to Islamic orthodoxy was second to none. According to Wickham, this “placed the Brotherhood in an awkward position. On the one hand, the Brotherhood and the Salafis were part of the same broad ideological current, and any stand taken by the Brotherhood against the Salafis would undermine the credibility of the Brotherhood’s democratic commitments” (pp. 194–95). Given this challenging ideological pickle, it seems unlikely that the Brotherhood’s reformists would have succeeded had they followed Wickham’s prescription and tried to bring the movement’s base around to their more enlightened way of thinking. Too much reform would have been a recipe for electoral defeat. Thus, while Wickham is almost certainly correct that individual ideological change is more than just a straightforward function of “considerations of strategic advantage” (p. 9), it may be that such considerations are indeed sufficient to explain the behavior of parties as a whole.

This is not a debate that will be settled easily, however, and Wickham is to be lauded for putting it on the table. In so doing, she has once again set the agenda for future scholarship on the phenomenon of political Islam.


— Waltraud Schelkle, *London School of Economics and Political Science*

This monograph describes and analyzes the six biggest bank bailouts in the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development world in 2007–10 and national reregulation efforts up to 2012. As everybody would expect from Cornelia Woll, a political economist from Sciences Po, this is an unusually readable book, with startling quotes and meaningful anecdotes, empirically rich and theoretically stimulating. The author has previously worked on business—government relationships in the context of global trade talks. Now she applies her expertise to the financial crisis in which this relationship was tested as never before, because at no time in history were govern-ments so much involved in providing public goods to business, be it the rule of law, defense of national interests in international fora, or social security for their employees.

In 2007–10, the financial industry had every possible incentive to cooperate with monetary, fiscal, and supervi-sory authorities trying to save it from the disastrous fallout of financial innovation and overextension of credit in the previous decade. And yet, only in two of the six countries—Denmark and France—does the author find that the financial industry cooperated with the government’s efforts at helping them. Was this widespread noncooperation due to unwillingness or due to incapacity on the part of relevant financial sector actors?

The Power of Inaction advances an interesting idea that would turn Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action on its head (pp. 7, 58–59): In crisis situations, the ability to refrain from collective action gives actors the power to make the other party bear the brunt of costly crisis management. The basic idea is implied by iterative games, such as the War of Attrition, in which the payoff varies with the length of the game. The more patient players, formalized as having a lower discount rate, will achieve the outcome with a more favorable payoff for themselves. However, Woll relates this idea to the time-honored debate about power, reclaiming territory for qualitative political economy that is easily lost to economists with their neat, but also somewhat sterile, models. In a masterful, jargon-free theory chapter on “the power of inaction,” she distinguishes structural power from productive power and maintains that it is the latter that can explain the variation in her case studies. This conceptualization challenges structuralists among her fellow political econom-ists with whom she sides, however, against the trivial notion of power in public-choice theories, namely, as being all about campaign finance and lobbying.

The six case studies are preceded by a chapter on regulatory philosophies that is surprisingly inconstant-ial for the following analysis. The author has the ingenious idea of presenting the six countries in a pair-wise comparison of those which should take similar measures: the United States and the United Kingdom as the two stereotypical, liberal market economies with well-organized financial interests; France and Germany as the countries with strong representations of collective private actors; Ireland and Denmark as the small open economies that are surprisingly similar in terms of huge house price bubbles and highly indebted households. For each of the two countries compared, the author then proceeds to show how different the rescue measures were.

With the exception of the Irish government, adminis-trations tried hard to make national financial industries get their acts together and share in the rescue effort. The chances for this were good in the United States because the government dealt with only nine systemically relevant banks, while banks in the City of London with its international presence are too many and diverse. Yet the nine big players flatly refused and forced the U.S. administration to address individual circumstances with a plethora of programs under the umbrella of TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The UK government imposed its rescue measures unilaterally, not least nationalization. This approach allowed for dictating the terms but also shifted the risk onto the taxpayer. The difference in the political system, fragmented in the United States and centralized in the UK, seems to explain the difference in policy outcomes (p. 109). Woll’s account of the U.S.—UK bailouts has been disputed by Pepper Culpepper and Raphael Reinke (“Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States,” Politics and Society 42 [no. 4, 2014]). They consider the structural power of UK banks to be superior to that of U.S. banks and claim that UK banks got a better deal.

This dispute raises the question of how one can measure the revealed power of private actors: by the potential risk to public finances at the height of the crisis or by the risk that materialized in terms of net costs at the point of winding down the rescue? Would either prove that private risk was strategically shifted or is it possible that the banks simply were too weak and unorganized to bear it?

Unlike the U.S. government, the French government managed to force the well-connected banks to a cooperative solution with a public guarantee as the backstop for panic. In Germany, the state was left with a costly and politically embarrassing bailout: Private-sector involvement was voluntary, and the well-connected Deutsche Bank refused to cooperate. The structure of the financial system, highly concentrated in France and very heterogeneous in Germany, seems to explain the difference (p. 137), although incompetence also played a role in Germany. Incompetence certainly is the decisive factor in the Ireland—Denmark comparison. The Irish “chicken game” (p. 164) ended with the worst outcome for both, the banks being stupified by greed while the government wavered between denial and panic. The Danish government, by contrast, solved the collective-action problem of its banks and coordinated the private rescue efforts unobtrusively.
These fascinating case studies have not convinced me of the financial industry’s power of inaction, however, not even in Ireland and Germany where the risks and possibly the final costs of bank bailouts were shifted onto the public purse. It is to the author’s credit that she does not belabor the point and gives readers the evidence and her balanced interpretation so that they can draw their own conclusions.

The case studies still show an important point for political economists: In a crisis, it is not the strength but the weakness of private actors that governments must fear. They are exposed to what Dani Rodrik and Richard Zeckhauser called “The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness” (Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7 [no. 4, 1988]). Public authorities can be exploited by private actors if these private actors are more valuable as a going concern. The concern was the perceived or real importance of banks for the capitalist economy. Wolf’s insight is that a political-economy account centered on the classical concept of power is not confined to analyzing power struggles as analogous to sports contests: purposeful actors directly competing with each other for victory.

Political economists interested in power can also study the weakness of strength (here: governments) and the strength of weakness (here: the financial industry), even when the sources of strength are beyond the powerful party’s control. The model for the banks’ behavior is the famous cartoon about Asterix and the Romans by René Goscinny and Albert Uderzo: Anarchy, helped by the occasional dose of magic (read: financial innovation), withstands the imposition of order. Woll’s book is a must-read for political economists.


— Irving Leonard Markovitz, Queens College and the Graduate Center of CUNY

Crawford Young has earned the right to engage a topic as large as this by studying African politics since 1955; by writing some of the major works in the discipline including Politics in the Congo, Ideology and Development in Africa, and The Colonial State in Comparative Perspective; and by supervising over sixty doctoral dissertations.

This volume deserves our special attention because of the reputation of the author, because of the ambitious scope of his enterprise covering the entire continent for the past 50 years, because of the detailed summaries of the political histories of many African states, because of the rarity of this type of endeavor which is so difficult and requires so much expert knowledge, and because of the glowing reviews the book has already received in major journals. Without in any way disparaging the author and his past accomplishments, I must, however, from the outset declare that I have found the current effort unsatisfactory because Young does not shed light on what I consider to be the key problems of African states in this century: growing inequality; inadequate democratic processes that effectively sideline growing numbers of people from gaining their substantive rights; a new radical Islam that is unconcerned with economic development or the nation-state or procedural democracy; the creation of a “deep state” in every African country that enables the simultaneous advancement of popular participation in constrained government institutions and the safeguarding of oligarchic interests; the on-going process of creating and entrenching traditional and new classes in ways that differ and deserve special attention in every African country.

Young’s major accomplishment in this book is to tell us in much detail what happened politically. Getting these narratives across to a general audience is not easy. To make these changes more understandable, Young has developed a thoughtful schema of historical periods. He has then added a way of looking at developments within these periods in terms of whether Africans felt “optimistic” or “pessimistic” about their “times.” He has tried to be even more precise by, above all, dealing with the politics and the political nature of the state.

I think that these categories are superficial. They do not get to the root causes of the issues with which I am concerned. They do not address Harold Laswell’s definition of political science as the study of who gets what, when, how (Harold D Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, 1936) to tell us which Africans benefit, by what means, and who suffers. Catherine Boone in her Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (2014) does this by showing how property institutions define political authority and shape hierarchy. Leonardo R. Arriola does it in his Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa (2012) by showing the development of business support of opposition parties in elections. And the best recent overview of African politics is Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention In Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (2013), because of her simple but elegant categorization and periodization of historical developments since the advent of independence that enables us to again see which Africans benefited in each of these periods.

Sections of the book, such as those dealing with ethnicity, are insightful. Young explores the complexity of ethnic identity including overlapping ethnic identities and variations in intensity. He says, “...[e]thnicity cannot serve as the master explanatory factor. Ethnicity is salient in most African countries, yet in only a few does it operate as key precipitant of insurgent uprising” (p. 324). Young says “there was strikingly little change in the set of state actors” over the last five decades (p. 248). That is a very interesting contention, but there is no effort to
One of these mechanisms, advanced by several scholars and observers of the movement, is that the Muslim Brotherhood’s highly selective recruitment methods and regimented organizational practices (documented by Wickham in her agenda-setting 2003 book Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt) generated cadres who were rigid in their adherence to party orthodoxy and unlikely to be hospitable to the minority of reformists who brought back from their encounters with non-Islamists and Westerners new ideas about where the movement should be going. Young says there was strikingly little change in the set of state actors over the last five decades (p. 248). Respondents were then asked questions to gauge their tolerance levels toward their least-favored group. We control for the level of trust in government, religiosity, interpersonal trust, contact, and political knowledge. Our data show soaring levels of intolerance among Egyptians. While it was the preeminent institution in the political process during the 1950s and 1960s, it has since the 1970s accepted a subordinate role in a presidential system that both safeguards its interests but limits its direct influence in politics.