ERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM, WHICH IS NOW BEING RAMMED INTO THE HEART OF Europe by the children of postcolonial immigrants, has pushed the problem of failing immigrant integration, particularly with respect to Muslims, to the top of the political agenda (Khalaf 2005; Leiken 2005). But isn’t the linkage between terror and integration — the dominant, reflex-like response to the July 2005 suicide bombing of the London Underground — misleading? Consider the “sheer normality of the young men involved, with British citizenship, born in Yorkshire into lower middle-class families from south Asia” (Peel 2005). Which integration policy could have helped to prevent evil from such quarters? If Islamic fundamentalism is indeed, as a noted French Islam specialist holds, an “expression of a cultural crisis in the age of globalization,” then this is surely too grand a target for any state policy, whatever the domain (Roy 2005, 3).

However misleading the connection between terror and failing immigrant integration may be, there is a widespread sense across Europe that some 40 years after the onset of the great post-Second World War migration, the state policies set up to accommodate this migration were insufficient, or even harmful. Even in states long believed to adhere to articulate and coherent national models of immigrant integration, such as the multicultural Netherlands and assimilationist France, this sense of failure is strong. In the Netherlands, a parliamentary inquiry into government policy toward ethnic minorities between 1970 and 2000 came to the devastating conclusion that if some migrants in the Netherlands succeeded, then they did so in spite of, rather than thanks to, government policy (“Parliamentary Report” 2004). In France, a similar review of the French postwar immigration experience conducted by the Cour des Comptes noted that the state had always been fixated on refining instruments of immigration control and that
integration policy remained “badly defined in its objectives and principles,” “incoherent,” “contradictory” and “insufficient” (2004, 9-10).

I argue in this chapter that the key features of the policy solutions offered in response to the integration crisis are the weakening of national distinctiveness and a convergence with respect to the forms and contents of integration policy. The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did. Gary Freeman rightly notes that the concept of “national models of incorporation... lend[s] too much dignity to the patchwork of institutions, laws, and practices that constitute incorporation frameworks in the West” (2003, 3). The French self-critique through the Cour des Comptes powerfully affirms Freeman’s view.

Not plagued by such doubts, much of the scholarly literature nevertheless continues to draw a distinction, within a liberal-democratic spectrum, between difference-friendly multiculturalism and universalist assimilationism; it also identifies segregationism in some guest-worker-receiving countries, which is seen as beyond the liberal-democratic pale.¹ A review of recent policy trends in three countries — the Netherlands, France and Germany — that are commonly taken as representatives of these approaches (multiculturalism, assimilationism and segregationism, respectively) will attest to the implausibility of such classification. In France, it has been de rigueur since the early 1990s to reject any presumption of cultural assimilation. The most recent report by the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI), chaired by philosopher Blandine Kriegel, invokes the Rawls-Habermasian distinction between political and ethical integration to beef up this stance: “[D]ans les républiques démocratiques, l’État n’a pas vocation à imposer des valeurs car il laisse aux citoyens la liberté de les choisir” (2003, 84).² Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy further illustrates this position: “L’intégration, c’est : ‘Je t’accueille dans le creuset républicain comme tu est.’ L’assimilation, c’est : ‘Je te fais disparaître’” (Barbier and Conan 2004).³ This is the general creed of liberal democracy, from Canada to France. At the same time, the proverbially difference-friendly, multicultural Netherlands is urging migrants to accept Dutch norms and values in the context of a policy of civic integration that is only an inch (but still an inch!) away from the cultural assimilationism once attributed to the French. And the pariah among migrant-receiving states in the West, segregationist Germany, has recently liberalized its nationality law in a big way, thus including its huge migrant population among its citizenry; and it has adopted (or is about
to adopt) the same civic integration and anti-discrimination policies and laws that are currently taking hold in the rest of Europe. Hence, with respect to the notion of national models, it is apposite to speak of a transformation of immigrant integration in western Europe.

**Forces of Transformation**

The forces of transformation are essentially two: a new context and mindset conducive to immigration; and Europeanization. With respect to the first, there is a growing awareness that far from being a unique historical episode, immigration is a permanent, even desirable feature of European societies for demographic and economic reasons. This constitutes a fundamental change of position. Well into the early 1990s — the last and perhaps most drastic expression being French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua’s martial quest for “zero immigration” — European states sternly rejected new labour migration. The migration that still happened, such as family and refugee migration, was grudgingly accepted for constitutional reasons, but it was certainly not wanted. Exemplified by the “firm but fair” logo that has informed the British approach to immigration since the late 1960s, closure to the outside was often taken as a precondition for being inclusive and accommodating to the migrants that were already inside. This condition for “fair” integration is no longer valid. Perhaps even more than the economic case for choosing “the best and brightest” in globalizing education and labour markets, the demographic case for new-seed immigration is now overwhelming, especially in Europe.

In the late nineteenth century, European demographic decline was already worrying demographers and political elites (see Barraclough 1967), but the alarming difference is that relative decline has since turned into absolute decline. A century ago, the countries that constitute today’s European Union still accounted for 14 percent of the world’s population; that figure is down to 6 percent today, and it is expected to decrease to 4 percent by 2050. “There has not been such a sustained reduction in the European population since the Black Death of the 14th century,” writes noted British historian Niall Ferguson (2004). This augurs badly for the EU’s ambitious goal to become “the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.” We are only beginning to understand the bleak implications of shrinking and aging populations for Europe’s economies and welfare states, but the case for new migration has already been understood and accepted by left and right alike. Accordingly, the recently issued declaration of the European Council (the intergovernmental steering body of the European Union) on immigrant integration policy opens with the statement, “Immigration is a permanent feature of European society. If the flow of immigrants... is orderly and well-managed, Member States reap many benefits” (Council of the European Union 2004, 15).

This new context and mindset have important implications for integration policy. First, immigrant integration is elevated from a fringe problem to become a central challenge to the entire society. For the first time, European states are beginning to see the need for a “global and coherent policy of immigrant integration,” as the French Cour des Comptes puts it (2004, 17). There is also a clearer distinction being made between different phases of the integration process and an understanding that these require different policy responses. The most pertinent distinction here is between newcomers, who are targeted by new policies of civic integration, and the second- or third-generation offspring of migrants, whose equal participation in society is to be encouraged by anti-discrimination laws and policies.

The second force driving the transformation of immigrant integration is the process of Europeanization. The shift from one-time to recurrent immigration could in principle still be handled in nationally distinct ways; it points to a shared problem, but it does not prescribe a response. Only Europeanization explains why there is convergence in the new integration policies. Europe is burying the national models of old in two ways: through legal mandate and through cultural standardization. With respect to legal mandate, the entire migration function is slowly but steadily coming under the purview of European Community (EC) law. The development of a joint EU immigration policy has been on the agenda since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and with respect to family migration and asylum there are now EC directives that legally bind the member states. In terms of priorities clearly subordinate to migration control, migrant integration is nevertheless increasingly coming into the ambit of EC law. Milestones in this area are the 2000 race directive, which obliges member states to pass anti-discrimination laws by 2003, and the 2003 directive on third-state permanent legal residents,
which in important respects realizes the long-standing quest to approximate the residence and free-movement rights of non-EU immigrants to those of EU citizens. Finally, in November 2004, the Council of the European Union for the first time agreed on common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the EU. Though nonbinding, this agreement is likely to further the harmonization of integration policies across Europe.

Perhaps even more than by legal mandate, Europeanization proceeds by means of cultural standardization. There is now a dense network of academics, journalists and policy experts monitoring best practices in other countries and feeding them back into the national debates. One example, which I will discuss, is the civic integration policy, which was pioneered in the Netherlands and has since been adopted across northern and western Europe, most notably in France and Germany. Although the reference point for the diffusion of best practices is not Europe but all liberal democracies, ongoing Europeanization has still provided the most immediate cognitive impetus and organizational cues for this diffusion.

Policy Convergence in the European Union

Of what does the stated policy convergence substantively consist? Because they were agreed upon by the justice and home ministers of the member states and thus reflect national policy preferences, the November 2004 European Council conclusions on immigrant integration policy offer a unique window on the general direction of integration policies across Europe (Council of the European Union 2004). The first joint feature of these policies, which is no novelty, is to be broadly if imperfectly inclusive. As Freeman points out, this is “counter-intuitive,” if one considers that many of Europe’s migrants arrived uninvited, and that national electorates are generally hostile toward large-scale immigration, especially of non-European provenance (2003, 3). This inclusiveness is due to the postwar rise of a human rights discourse and its accompanying international and national legal regimes, which extended rights from national citizens to all persons, irrespective of citizenship (Soysal 1994). It is thus no European specificity but germane to all Western liberal democracies.
Inclusiveness is usually formulated in the metaphor of two-way integration. Accordingly, the first of the EU’s common basic principles of immigrant integration policy reads: “Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States.” This means that not just migrants but also the receiving societies have to change, the latter being mandated to create “the opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural, and political participation” (Council of the European Union 2004, 19). This stance has become a platitude, but one should not forget its extreme improbability. Ever since the transition from nomadic to settled life during the Neolithic Revolution, settled populations expected newcomers to adapt to their ways — when in Rome do as the Romans do. The idea that something as complex and massive as the receiving society should change in response to the arrival of numerically inferior migrants — who, as individuals, are ontologically different from a society — is unheard of. That a settled society would change as a result of migration is, of course, inevitable, but elevating this to an ethical maxim — a should — is an unprecedented stance to take.

The second of the EU’s common basic principles offers insight into what is expected of migrants: “Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.” What are these values? They are the joint stock of all liberal democracies: “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Council of the European Union 2004, 19). All of these are political values, not substantive ethical values. Europe is becoming like America in that — much as John Rawls’s “political liberalism” has formulated it — the integration of society can occur only in terms of a procedural consensus on what is right, not in terms of a substantive consensus on what is good. Political liberalism’s application in the migration domain is a common preference of integration over assimilation, assimilation meaning the imposition of the substantive culture of the majority society — “comprehensive doctrine,” in Rawls’s terms — on newcomers (see Rawls 1993); the precise meaning of integration is to abstain from this. Accordingly, the EU’s common basic principles include “[f]ull respect for the immigrants’ and their descendants’ own language and culture” (Council of the European Union 2004, 20).

With respect to migrants’ “own language and culture,” the crucial question is whether their expression is left to the free play of society, or whether the state becomes involved in their protection and maintenance. Interestingly, only Spain,
under a socialist government bent on setting a progressive counterpoint to its conservative predecessor, wanted to commit the EU states to a multicultural stance on this question, obliging them to proactively further and protect migrant languages and cultures. This quest was rebutted. The compromise formula, “full respect,” does not go beyond the classic liberal stance on matters of culture and way of life, leaving these things to the discretion of individuals and not considering them the business of the state. Moreover, while the council document reiterated that “the freedom to practice one’s religion and culture” was guaranteed by constitutional law, it emphasized the strings attached to it — respect for the “equality of women,” the “rights and interests of children” and the “freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion” (Council of the European Union 2004, 23). This reservation reflects the most recent difficulties with Muslim integration in Europe, which have caused the pendulum to swing from cultural maintenance to enforcement of liberal core values.

The decreased emphasis on cultural recognition in the EU document, while at one level consistent with the precepts of liberalism, points to an important reorientation of European states’ immigrant integration policies. Previous programmatic statements by European states were much stronger in their affirmation of the integrity of migrant cultures and ways of life; and some states — most notably Sweden and the Netherlands — went even further in protecting and supporting them. Instead, the EU’s third common basic principle reads: “Employment is a key part of the integration process” (Council of the European Union 2004, 20). In response to the alarming degree of unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and their offspring in Europe — which contrasts sharply with that of the United States or Canada, where migrant ethnics are generally employed — socio-economic integration has become the key focus of European states’ immigrant integration policies. This reorientation is framed by a new, postnational-model philosophy of migrants’ self-sufficiency and autonomy, used in both the Netherlands and France, according to which — paradoxically — the primary task of the state is to make migrants independent of the state.

The inevitable result of the new focus on socio-economic integration is to shift the burden of adjustment onto the individual migrant, particularly in the first phases of entering the new society. Accordingly, the fourth principle in the EU statement on integration policy is: “Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration” (Council of the
European Union 2004, 20). This refers to the new policy of civic integration, which the Netherlands pioneered in the late 1990s, and which has since been adopted by, among other European states, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany and France. The policy obliges newcomers to enrol in civics and language courses immediately after entry (in the Netherlands, lately, even before entry), and noncompliance tends to be met with financial penalties or denial of permanent legal residence permits. The novelty of the civic integration policy is its obligatory character, which has increased notably over time, and this notional "integration" policy has even been transmuted into a tool of migration control, helping states to restrict especially the entry of unskilled and unadapted family migrants. The obligatory, even repressive character of the civic integration policy makes it a prime instance of an illiberal policy "in the name of liberalism" (King 1999), which sets it apart from similar — yet voluntary and humanitarian — civic integration policies in Canada.

However, a liberal counterpoint to increasingly illiberal civic integration policies is the emphasis on anti-discrimination laws and policies, which — forced by direct EU mandate — are now taking hold across Europe. Accordingly, the last of the EU's integration principles I will mention here is: "Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration" (Council of the European Union 2004, 21). Equality of treatment, irrespective of one's ethnic origin or any other ascriptive marker, is certainly the stock-in-trade of all liberal societies and guaranteed by their constitutions. Yet to enforce this by explicit anti-discrimination laws, which lowers the hurdle of claims-making for the victims of discrimination and, above all, expands the reach of the nondiscrimination principle from the public to the private sector, is something new. Though enabled by a unique window of opportunity at the EU level (see Guiraudon 2004), the proliferation of anti-discrimination laws and policies reflects Europe's structural transformation into a multi-ethnic society, as well as a general willingness to tackle the specific inequalities that go along with it.

The remainder of this chapter explores the origins and dynamics of civic integration, which has raised eyebrows because of its illiberal connotations. If one juxtaposes civic integration with the anti-discrimination trend, one will see the interesting complementarities and countervailing, if not contradictory, features exhibited by both policies. Both are complementary in addressing different phas-
es in the migration process — its beginning (civic integration) and end (anti-discrimination). (Note that the very existence of anti-discrimination proves that civic integration has failed.) On the other side, both civic integration and anti-discrimination adhere to opposite logics. The logic of civic integration is to treat migrants as individuals, who are depicted as responsible for their own integration; civic integration applies to the migration domain the austere neoliberalism that frames economic globalization. The opposite logic of anti-discrimination is to depict migrants and their offspring as members of groups, who are victimized by majority society, thus reintroducing at the tail end of integration the ameliorative group logic that had been thrown out at its beginning by the harsh individualism of civic integration.

The peculiar coexistence of civic integration and anti-discrimination reveals that, in reality, two-way integration consists of two separate one-way processes: at first, the burden of change is all on the migrant; later, the burden of change is all on society. Ever since continental European courts pioneered the constitutionalization of alien rights and thus facilitated the transformation of European societies into immigrant societies (see Marzal 2004), such rights have been seen as incremental, increasing with the migrant's length of stay. The dualism of (obligatory) civic integration and anti-discrimination subtly reinforces this idea, in that the migrant's initial experience in the new society is precarious, and she gradually has to “earn” the rights of full membership. In this, Europe has remained different from the classic immigration nations, in which from the first day the legal immigrant is considered a fully functioning and rightful member of the new society.

The Case of Civic Integration

The Netherlands

W

e must first locate the turn to civic integration within the specific Dutch context. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Netherlands pursued Europe's most prominent and proudly exhibited multiculturalism policy, which envisaged emancipation for designated ethnic minorities, yet within their own state-supported ethnic infrastructures — including ethnic schools, ethnic
### Table 1

Absolute and Relative Unemployment Levels among Citizens and Non-EU Foreigners in the Netherlands, France and Germany, 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment, citizens (percent)</th>
<th>Unemployment, non-EU foreigners (percent)</th>
<th>Relative unemployment, non-EU foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (1999)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2000)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2000)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2000)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

hospitals and ethnic media. Alas, in the shadow of multiculturalism, one of Europe’s biggest socio-economic integration failures occurred. The figures are daunting. Whereas in the majority of EU countries the unemployment rate of non-EU foreigners is about twice that of citizens, in Holland, the unemployment rate among non-EU foreigners, despite great fluctuation, at a minimum has been three times that among citizens in the past seven years; in 1999, it was 5.4 times higher than that among citizens (see table 1).

In 1999, only one-third (33.7 percent) of non-EU foreigners were gainfully employed in the Netherlands; the vast remainder were either not in the labour market at all (like many Muslim women) or dependent on social benefits. In fact, migration to the Netherlands, like migration to many other continental European countries (which, since the late 1970s, has been mostly through asylum and family reunification), is often a direct march into welfare-state dependency. In 1998, 47 percent of all persons on welfare in the Netherlands were immigrants; among non-Western foreigners, 20 percent depended on welfare, which is 10 times higher than the welfare dependency rate of native Dutch. In other sectors, the picture is no better. Again in 1998, high school dropout rates were 2.4 times higher for immigrant children than for native Dutch children (19 percent and 8 percent, respectively), despite the fact that state funding was double for ethnic minority children; the dropout rates were especially bad for the two most problematic groups: Moroccans (39 percent dropout rate) and Turks (35 percent). Furthermore, residential segregation is extremely high in the Netherlands. Whereas only one-third of the population of Berlin-Kreuzberg, Germany’s city quarter with the highest ethnic density, is composed of foreigners, the foreign-resident rate in Amsterdam’s and Rotterdam’s ethnic quarters is above two-thirds, and these two cities — the largest in the Netherlands — are expected to become predominantly foreign-populated within the next few decades. The situation in Dutch prisons is even bleaker. Most European prisons tend to be overpopulated by foreigners (in sharp contrast to those in the US and Canada), and this is especially true in the Netherlands: in 1997, 32 percent of the Dutch prison population was foreign. If one considers the share of foreigners in the population, this makes for an over-representation of 6.3 times, the highest in Europe (see table 2).

Particularly galling with respect to failing socio-economic and civic immigrant integration in the Netherlands was that Germany, the notorious “anti-integration
### Table 2

**Share of Foreigners in the Prison Population in the Netherlands, France, Germany and Britain, 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion of the prison population (percent)</th>
<th>Degree of over-representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

model” (Michalowski 2005), fared much better than the Dutch standard-bearer in this domain (Koopmans 2002). In fact, so dear to the scholarly community was the notion of Dutch leadership in immigrant integration that an earlier report comparing the Netherlands, Germany and France, which showed very much the same figures as Koopmans (2002, 2005), still concluded that “[i]ntegration in the Netherlands seems to be least problematic” (Doomernik 1998, 75).

The Dutch integration failure raises the question of whether it is causally related to the multicultural ethnic minorities policy. No conclusive evidence for either the absence or the existence of a causal link exists. The German experience, in which socio-economic integration has been relatively successful, despite the absence of an explicit integration policy, suggests the unimportance of integration policy — of whatever colour — for integration outcomes. Anita Böcker and Dietrich Thränhardt argue that immigrant integration in Germany occurred above all through the highly organized production sector, with its factory councils (Betriebsräte), strong labour unions and system of dual education (vocational training in private firms combined with formal education in state-run Berufsschulen [vocational schools]). And when, as it did in Berlin, the production sector suddenly collapsed, “even a progressive integration policy could not make a difference” (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003, 11).

On the other hand, Koopmans lists a number of “mechanisms” that link multiculturalism policy with “unintended negative outcomes in the socio-economic domain” (2005, 2). They are all based on multiculturalism's tendency to keep ethnic groups apart and to prevent their participation in mainstream society. The first mechanism was the commitment of the Netherlands, until the mid-1990s, to linguistic multiculturalism, supporting mother-tongue education and providing essential government communication in minority languages. This had the effect of easing access to the welfare state, but it closed access to the labour market and to mainstream education. “[L]inguistic pluralism,” argues Koopmans, “allowed immigrants to survive in the margins of the welfare state without knowledge of the Dutch language” (2005, 15). If one adds the extra-low incentives for return-oriented migrants to learn a language that (except in the Flemish part of Belgium) is not spoken anywhere else in the world, the propensity not to learn Dutch is overwhelming, and non-Dutch speakers are excluded from most nonmenial jobs. A second mechanism consists of social networks and social capital formation. As economic sociology has shown, the weak ties that stretch
beyond one's primordial group are strong in terms of procuring jobs and other vital resources — precisely the ties that will not materialize if one stays within one's ethnic group. And, finally, one effect of creating a facade of multicultural tolerance (or, in the view of critics, political correctness) is that it feeds an unarticulated groundswell of resentment and discrimination. An intra-European comparison of majority attitudes toward immigrants noted that the Dutch respondents tended to be superficially more tolerant and welcoming, yet subtly more negatively prejudiced than their European peers (Pettigrew 1998, 84). Moreover, in a way that recalls the populist right's piracy of the right to difference from the multicultural left in mid-1980s France, the public discourse of multiculturalism may generate a “me too” dynamic among those to whom multiculturalism policy was not originally meant to apply. In the Dutch case, the signal received from public policy that segregation was good legitimated and reinforced a complementary tendency toward “white flight.” As Koopmans bitingly puts it, “The ethnic Dutch who evaded ‘black’ neighborhoods and schools could therefore do so with a perfectly good conscience” (2005, 17).

The jury deciding the causes of the Dutch socio-economic integration failure is out. The relevant matter is that the political elites responded by scaling back official multiculturalism and turning to civic integration. Their goal was migrant participation in mainstream institutions (later labelled “shared citizenship”) and autonomy, which was to be achieved through Dutch-language acquisition and labour-market integration (see the overview by Han Entzinger, one of the intellectual engineers of the civic integration approach [2003]). The basis for this was the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law: Wet inburgering nieuwkomers (WIN). WIN obliges most non-EU newcomers to participate in a 12-month integration course, which consists of 600 hours of Dutch-language instruction, civic education and preparation for the labour market.

When WIN was introduced, the coercive aspect was still subordinate to the service aspect. There were financial penalties attached to noncompliance, but they were relatively minor and hardly ever enforced by the responsible local governments. Moreover, this was a state-paid service with incontrovertibly positive intentions — to get migrants to work, to help them learn Dutch and thus to make them functioning members of Dutch society. However, over time the obligatory, coercive side of civic integration moved to the fore. On the part of the Dutch state, this entailed a paradoxical double movement of withdrawal and increased presence.
On the side of state withdrawal, the philosophy of autonomy and self-sufficiency (zelfredzaamheid) underlying civic integration was quickly extended to its actual provision, requiring migrants to pay for the integration courses in full. In addition, the provision of integration courses was farmed out to private organizations, and state involvement in the whole affair was reduced to the holding of standardized final tests. The state does not care whether a migrant actually attends the courses; only the test result counts. It has thus become quite literally true that, in the words of a justice ministry official outlining the spirit of the new integration law, “everyone is responsible for his own integration” (Musso-Van der Velde 2005). As a counterpoint to this privatization of integration, coercive state involvement has massively increased. According to the new integration law, which went into effect in March 2006, not just newcomers but also settled immigrants (so-called oudkomers), not a few of them Dutch citizens, are required to pass an integration test, which presents the state with an enormous logistical task — identifying, mobilizing and policing the entire migrant population of the country.

The crucial innovation on the coercive side is to tie the granting of permanent residence permits to the successful passing of an integration test. This creates a linkage between the previously separate domains of migration control and immigrant integration. It also constitutes an entirely new view of immigrant integration. So far, the prevailing view has been that a secure legal status enhances integration; now, the lack of integration is taken as grounds for refusal of admission and residence, and the entire integration domain is potentially subordinated to the exigencies of migration control (see Groenendijk 2004; De Heer 2004). The most drastic expression of this is integration from abroad. According to the new integration law of 2006, applicants for family reunification must take an integration test at a Dutch embassy abroad as a precondition for being granted a temporary residence permit. Integration from abroad is not a Dutch invention. It was first introduced in the context of the German Aussiedler policy — a preferential immigration scheme for ethnic Germans — at the moment when the “ethnic” credentials of ethnic German migrants became questionable. However, the crucial difference is that the German government supported German-language acquisition abroad with the massive funding of schools and language courses, while no Dutch education programs exist abroad. Integration from abroad thus boils down to no integration whatsoever, making the integration test a perfect tool for preventing unwanted immigration.
What began as an immigrant integration policy has thus turned into its opposite: a no-immigration policy. What caused this evolution? If one considers that none of the civic integration policies in other European states has gone to such an extreme, then the explanation is obvious: the right-wing populist turn Dutch politics took after the assassination of iconic leader Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Anxious mainstream politicians with a finger on the anti-immigrant public pulse — most notably the tough-minded current minister for immigration and integration, Rita Verdonk — have since pushed for an increasingly restrictive Dutch migration policy.

However, the restrictive turn also has to be related to the demographic profile of the migrant categories targeted by civic integration. In the absence of a significant program for labour migration, the large majority of newcomers are asylum and family migrants, many of whom are low-skilled or unskilled; they have very little if any schooling, and no Dutch-language competence. The harshest measure — integration from abroad — will apply only to family migrants, who are mostly from Turkey and Morocco. Turkish and Moroccan ethnics in the Netherlands (and elsewhere in Europe) have a high propensity for endogamy. In effect, this means that even second- and third-generation migrants look for a marriage partner in their parents' country of origin. A recent Dutch report on imported marriages claims that 70 percent of young Turks marry someone from their parents' home country, while among young Moroccans, 60 percent of females and 50 percent of males do so ("Netherlands" 2005). The offspring of such unions grow up in ethnically closed families, thus reinforcing and perpetuating the ethnic seclusion that characterizes the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands. This is the very problem that the civic integration policy was designed to address from the start, but in its restrictive incarnation it is increasingly prominent.

France

The Dutch civic integration policy has quickly become a "model for Europe" (Michalowski 2004a), yet with significant national inflections. In Sweden and Finland, civic integration figures as more a right than an obligation, except when it comes to unemployed and welfare-dependent migrants, and there is no tying of integration programs to residence permits. In Denmark and Austria, the obligatory aspect of civic integration and its linkage with residence permits have been
dominant from the start; the scope of the program has remained limited to newcomers in Denmark, but it includes certain “old” migrants on temporary resident permits in Austria (Michalowski 2004b).

The French version of civic integration takes a middle position, moving from initial voluntarism toward the obligatory and coercive pole, though stopping well short of the Dutch extreme. Its domestic precursors are the plates-formes d’accueil (introduction platforms) — a program of voluntary half-day instruction for certain categories of newcomers (originally only family migrants) introduced by the socialist Jospin government in 1998. In July 2003, the Gaullist Raffarin government launched the more ambitious program of “contrats d’accueil et de l’intégration” (CAI), which has evidently taken its cues from the Dutch example (HCI 2001, 47-8). It consists of one day of civics instruction, followed (when deemed necessary) by 500 hours of French-language instruction. Interestingly, only about one-third of the 150,000 expected newcomers in 2006 (the first expected year of full operation of the new policy) are targeted for enrolment in a French-language course (Tabet 2004). The francophone background of the majority of newcomers to France is evidently an asset that positively distinguishes the French from the Dutch or German civic integration challenges. While this might lead to less emphasis on the earliest phase of immigrant integration, there is also an opposite consideration. As the Cour des Comptes outlined, with an eye on the French distaste for ethnic-origin classification, accueil (reception) constitutes the only moment in the integration process “where the targeted public can be easily designated without creating a legitimacy problem for public action” (2004, 125).

CAI and the reform of accueil constitutes one of two pillars of a comprehensive re-founding of the French politics of integration; the other pillar is the struggle against discrimination in terms of anti-discrimination policy. The first targets the beginning, the latter the end of the integration process (HCI 2003).

In an interesting counterpoint to the Dutch case, the obligatory aspect of the French integration contract was much slower in moving to the fore. While about 90 percent of applicable newcomers sign an integration contract, only 65 percent of those who are prescribed a French-language course follow up on it (Tabet 2004). This has provided impetus for making CAI obligatory. The Sarkozy Law of November 2003, which drastically restricts access to legal permanent residence, makes the receipt of a 10-year residence card dependent on “l’intégration républicaine,” which the law defines as “connaissance de la langue française et des
principes que régissent la République française” (quoted in Lochak 2004). Most importantly, family migrants (spouses and minor children), who previously had direct access to a 10-year residence card (or at least the same residence status as the sponsor), now receive only a one-year card, and only after two years can they apply for the all-important 10-year card, subject to the intégration républicaine proviso.

As in the Netherlands, the intention is to fight ethnic endogamy, referred to by Sarkozy as “communautarisme parfaitement clanique” (perfectly clannish communitarianism). Sarkozy elaborates the rationale: “Ce que nous voulons, c’est obliger celui qui fait venir, dans le cadre du regroupement familial, une personne, laquelle est généralement sa femme, à lui permettre d’apprendre le français et de s’insérer dans notre société” (quoted in Lochak 2004, 4). Criticized by Lochak as a “perversion de la logique et de l’équité” (a perversion of logic and equity), this amounts to a double illiberalism in pursuit of a liberal goal: it does not just directly oblige a person to become autonomous, which is the usual rationale of civic integration, but it employs patriarchy and third-party pressure (a husband) to oblige another person (his wife) to be free (2004, 4). While the Sarkozy Law does not specify how l’intégration française is to be formally determined, the next logical step is to determine such integration in terms of the integration contract (CAI), and to make the latter obligatory for a 10-year residence card. This promptly occurred in the 2006 immigration law, passed under Sarkozy’s second spell as interior minister.

If the obligatory turn of civic integration has been slow in coming, one reason is that the notion of “contract,” which is rather casually deployed for the civic integration schemes in the Netherlands and other European countries, is taken rather more seriously in France. For the president of the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI), Blandine Kriegel, the integration contract is “inscribed in the French tradition of the contrat social” (Kriegel 2004). Thus approximated to the foundation of the French Republic, the integration contract could not be forced upon the migrant; otherwise, it would not be a “contract.” A contract creates obligations but logically cannot be an obligation in itself. Accordingly, the Haut Conseil’s initial proposal for an integration contract, which would “show the willingness of immigrants to fit into the receiving society,” insisted that it had to be voluntary (HCI 2001, 60).

The French couching of civic integration in terms of the contrat social is interesting in a second respect: the foreign (Dutch) sources become invisible.
Kriegel, the integration contract is a continuation of the French model, untainted by foreign influences: “Il ne faudrait pas qu’en important des méthodes fonctionnant parfois dans d’autres pays, nous coupions notre lien vivant avec l’héritage de l’intégration républicaine” (Kriegel 2004). The unspoken purpose of this nationalization of civic integration was to rebut calls on left and right alike for “positive discrimination” (on the anti-discrimination front), which posed an even bigger threat to the French model. Whatever the intention, the will to paint in national colours what is undoubtedly a foreign import (or, rather, the common European démarche in matters of immigrant reception) is unmistakable. When first launching the idea of integration contracts, the HCI (under a different president) was less reluctant to express the postnational spirit of civic integration, calling it a policy that was “pragmatic” and that had a “precise goal: to permit newcomers to become rapidly autonomous in the receiving society” (HCI 2001, 49). These could also have been the words of a Dutch or German integration pundit.

Germany

While there was some denial of the nondomestic roots of the contrats d’intégration in France, reference to the Dutch model lent even more legitimacy to the introduction of similar Integrationskurse (integration courses) in Germany. Faithful to its postnationalism, Germany, in an opposite move to that of France, repressed the indigenous sources of the new approach in its Aussiedler policy. Since the 1990s, Germany had offered language courses to would-be ethnic migrants in Eastern Europe and Russia, which prepared them for a status test that they had to pass before they would be entitled to immigrate to Germany; and after arrival there was additional state-funded language instruction and civic orientation for a period of six months. The new Integrationskurse, the focus of which is likewise on language acquisition, simply extend to non-EU, non-ethnic migrants a program that was already in place for ethnic Germans. The true novelty of the Integrationskurse is that ethnic and non-ethnic migrants are now enrolled in the same program of 600 hours of German-language instruction and 30 hours of civics instruction. This is also the last stab against the old notion that ethnic migration is not immigration but rather a homecoming of co-ethnics, to be processed in a separate legal regime.

However, the influence of the Aussiedler paradigm shows in the reluctance to follow the obligatory and coercive tilt of the Dutch model. Since the idea of the Integrationskurse was first introduced by the Süßmuth Commission of 2001
which prepared the ground for the 2004 German immigration law), immigrants’ right to participate was stressed, though it was never in doubt that their attendance would also be obligatory. The Süssmuth Commission wanted to have its cake and eat it too: “[T]he courses should be obligatory; however, penalties in the case of non-attendance... cannot be implemented and are not practicable” (2001, 260). How can there be an obligation without penalty? The same twisted logic is found in the few clauses of the 2004 immigration law (Zuwanderungsgesetz) that deal with the promotion of integration and lay out the design of the integration courses. Article 43 creates an “entitlement” to participate for non-EU newcomers; article 43a, in turn, creates an “obligation” to participate for those who are “entitled” according to the preceding clause but who “cannot hold a simple oral conversation in the German language,” and for settled migrants who are dependent on welfare. According to this bizarre construct, newcomers are at the same time “entitled” and “obliged” to enrol in an integration course.

If there was debate surrounding the new policy, it focused on the question of sanctions (positive or negative?) and who would pay (the migrant or the state, and if the latter, the federal state, the subfederal states or Länder, or the communes?). The dividing line on both questions was obvious — the conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union pushing for a hard line of negative sanctions and user payment; and the majority in the ruling Social Democratic Party and the Greens, in line with the recommendations of the Süssmuth Commission (2001, 260-5), favouring positive incentives and having the federal state and the Länder pay. In the end, a compromise was reached on both questions. The bulk of the costs are now carried by the federal state, and migrants are required to pay only a modest fee of one euro per hour (if any euro at all, due to generous opt-out clauses). An element of the positive sanctions remains, in the sense that the residence requirement for as-of-right naturalization will be lowered from eight to seven years for those migrants who successfully complete the integration course. There is a larger catalogue of negative sanctions. When it comes to financial penalties, there is a (modest) reduction of social benefits. With respect to the denial of residence permits, an elastic formula was inserted in the 2004 immigration law: noncompliance “can” lead to the non-renewal of a temporary residence permit or the denial of a permanent one, provided that these permits are discretionary (article 8.3). This is a “can” with considerable strings attached (existing family and other social ties in the Federal Republic must
especially be considered), so it is not likely to cut much ice (see Heinen 2004). Most importantly, family migrants are not at all affected by this, because their entitlement to a residence permit is not discretionary but grounded in constitutional law. As the majority of newcomers to Germany arrive as family migrants, the rough edges of the civic integration policy do not apply to them (see Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2005a, 208).

**The European Union**

The Dutch model of civic integration not only has spread horizontally to other European states but it has also had a vertical effect on the emergent European Union law on immigrant integration. Most notably, the November 2003 directive on long-term third-state residents carries its imprint. For many years, this measure was one of the main demands of the pro-migrant lobby in Europe; its original thrust was to align the status of settled immigrants in Europe with that of EU citizens, especially with respect to free-movement rights within the EU. During the long negotiations over this directive, Germany and Austria (with the Netherlands supporting them) pushed for a new restriction that would tie the acquisition of secure residence status — which, in turn, would allow free movement in Europe — to compliance with the “integration conditions” set by national law. Replacing the term “integration measures,” used in the old text, with “integration conditions” allows member states to have migrants pay for the integration courses (see Groenendijk 2004, 122-3). More importantly, the directive allows a multiplication of the civic integration obligation for moving non-EU citizens: having complied with the civic integration requirement in the first state, the migrant may be asked to comply with a similar integration requirement in the second state (though only with respect to language acquisition). This constitutes a barrier for intra-European mobility that does not exist for EU citizens, thus partially defeating the original purpose of the directive.

**Illicit Policy in a Liberal State**

While there is considerable national variation with respect to the scope and the level of restrictiveness of civic integration policies across Europe, a focus on “obligation” (and a reverse de-emphasis on “rights”) is a feature they all share. Desmond King argued that a balance between rights and duties is inherent in “liberal contractualism,” and that at times this balance could shift decidedly toward
“duties” (1999, 18). Civic integration is an instance, like eugenics and workfare policies, of illiberal social policy in a liberal state. King’s important insight is that such policies are not born of sources extrinsic to liberalism, such as nationalism or racism, but are inherent in liberalism itself. For instance, liberalism’s core tenets of freedom and equality presuppose that “members of the polity possess the necessary reasoning powers or ability to... plan for their future” (King 1999, 8). This creates illiberal temptations with respect to those who do not meet these criteria.

By the same token, it would be wrong to interpret civic integration of immigrants as a rebirth of nationalism or racism. These policies carefully observe the dividing line between integration, which leaves the ethical orientation of the migrant intact, and assimilation, which does not. As the French Haut Conseil à l’Intégration put it, “l’intégration civique doit respecter l’identité de chacun et se marquer de l’assimilation”; it is limited to “enseigner aux nouveaux arrivants... la loi commune, autrement dit la Constitution” (2003, 106, 85). Whereas the Netherlands has recently become more aggressive in disseminating “Dutch norms and values” (Musso-Van der Velde 2005, 2), the only provocative part of this campaign — when disseminated in the form of an instructional video for integration abroad — was pictures of kissing men, rock concerts and women with naked breasts, and these images were promptly censored for Islamic viewers.

A Manual for Germany, distributed to newcomers by the German commissioner for foreigners’ affairs, remarks under the rubric “Art and Culture” that “[c]afés serve espresso, cappuccino and café au lait,” that “[p]otatoes are served as a side dish along with French baguettes and Turkish flatbread” and that “German popular music is heavily influenced by American music” (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2005b, 28). Not only is the diction of these statements cognitive rather than normative, with no presumption that newcomers share such preferences, but it is also clear that every attempt has been made to dilute distinctive German traits.

The paradox of civic integration is still that it involves pursuing liberal purposes (shared citizenship, autonomy) through illiberal means. A normative judgment on this is beyond the scope of this chapter. Consider, however, that this is only part of a larger paradox of liberalism: the realization of liberal values always depends upon states, which are by nature exclusive and illiberal institutions with borders and (generally) ascribed rather than freely chosen membership.
Discussion

Convergence in immigrant integration in Western Europe is not exhausted by the trend toward civic integration. A second convergent trend is the rise of anti-discrimination, partially in response to European Union law; a third convergent trend is toward more inclusive citizenship laws by means of facilitating naturalization and introducing conditional \textit{jus soli} citizenship for the descendants of immigrants; a fourth trend is the reinforcement of state neutrality in questions of cultural difference, and a parallel retreat from multicultural recognition.

In reviewing the entire field of western European immigrant integration, one notices the confluence of two very different, perhaps contradictory, types of liberalism. On the one hand, there is Rawlsian liberalism, with its emphasis on equality, individual rights and neutrality; this is the liberalism that has moved states from assimilation to integration and that requires states to assure a modicum of equality for all members of society. On the other hand, recent policies of civic integration, in particular, have revealed the parallel existence of a liberalism of power and disciplining, which has attracted much attention in a Foucault-inspired literature on governmentality and neoliberalism (see, for example, Rose 1999; Dean 1999). In the optic of this Foucauldian liberalism, the contemporary state, hollowed out by economic globalization, is coercing individuals, as well as the communities of which they are a part, into releasing their self-producing and self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver. Civic integration for immigrants is equivalent to workfare policies for the general population — policies that have arisen in the context of shrinking welfare states (see Handler 2004). Both seek to make people self-sufficient and autonomous by illiberal means.

Because immigrants stand at the intersection of different nation-state societies, one is inclined to interpret repressive policies toward them in nationalist or racist terms. However, this has the smell of yesteryear — liberal constitutionalism rules out these possibilities. Instead, the repressive impulse, at least at the level of state policy, now stems from liberalism itself; this is the distinct contribution of the Foucault-inspired reading of liberalism. John Stuart Mill had already limited liberalism to “human beings in the maturity of their faculties,” thus excluding all those who were not; and those not “in the maturity of their faculties” could be induced to achieve that state through — by definition — illiberal means.
Accordingly, for “barbarians” “despotism” was a “legitimated mode of government,” provided its purpose was their improvement (Dean 1999, 133). Contemporary civic integration or workfare policies are of the same kind, because they involve putting illiberal means to the service of liberal goals.

A difference, however, exists with respect to the context of repressive liberalism then and now. We no longer have nationally bounded societies (the context of empire, as in Mill’s example of the “good despot,” did not much change this) but a globally unbounded society. This changes the meaning of “integration” — we have shifted away from the old notion that integration had to be integration into a nation-state society. In her intriguing analysis of changing public school curricula in Britain, Canada and the US, Katharyne Mitchell found that the vision of good citizenship inculcated by public education was no longer centred on the national, if “multicultural,” self but on the “strategic cosmopolitan,” who could function in any national setting (2003). The perceived need to master global competition is indeed one reason why old group narratives of multiculturalism — perhaps nationalism’s historical rearguard (see Favell 1998 on Britain) — are giving way to a new focus on the individual and her autonomy and self-sufficiency.

Symptomatic, in this respect, is the centrality of employment in Europe’s contemporary immigrant integration policies. As the European Commission observed in its First Annual Report on Migration and Integration, “access to employment” has become “the most important political priority within national integration policies” (2004, 5). On one level, this priority is as old as the hills, consonant with Brecht’s belly-centred ethic of “Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral” (“First comes a full stomach, then come ethics”). However, on a more subtle level, this also displays a novel sense of integration in the postnational state as social inclusion, which is itself subordinate to the exigencies of globalization. In the European Union, for instance, the combat against social exclusion is not freestanding but tied to the global competition goal, formulated within the so-called Lisbon Strategy, of making the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010. From this perspective, antidiscrimination laws and policies, as envisioned in the EU race directive, do not so much aim at equality as allow a full utilization of society’s resources in the global competition. As Eberhard Eichenhofer puts it, women, the handicapped, the elderly and ethnic minorities “are to be fully included in the society and labour market of the member states, not least in order to reduce the costs for
social protection or welfare” (2005, 2). Overall, social inclusion becomes narrowly tied to the labour market rather than to the nation-state at large, motivated by the image of society as a “machinery of performance” (Haahr 2004, 225).

In its economic instrumentalism, integration as social inclusion is a world apart from old notions of cultural assimilation and nation-building. However, there is still a perfectionist dimension to it, and one with paternalist, obligation-imposing possibilities, in the sense that being in work is not just having an income; it is of intrinsic importance to an individual’s well-being, and thus to be pursued, or imposed, for its own sake. The main purpose of social inclusion is social cohesion — that is, order, not justice. This distinguishes social inclusion, as a Foucauldian liberalism, from the Rawlsian liberalism of equal opportunities, which was the lodestar of the classic welfare state: “Whereas the aim of equality of opportunity [is] to put people in a position in which they are able to participate in the economy and other aspects of social life, the aim of social inclusion also seems to include an element that sometimes requires people to become included. There are no rights without responsibilities” (Collins 2003, 24-5). Social inclusion is not about equality: “Social inclusion does not seek the same... outcomes for citizens. It concentrates its attention... on the absolute disadvantage of particular groups in society” (Collins 2003, 22). Social inclusion thus justifies group-specific policies of the state; it is indeed the prime justification of anti-discrimination policies that violate the equal-treatment principle, such as positive action. If France is being pushed toward colour-conscious anti-discrimination policies, thus mellowing its traditional rejection of communitarianism, the reason is that, like all states in the European Union today, it is under the sway of the social inclusion and cohesion objectives.

At the same time, one should beware of taking a Foucauldian perspective of repressive liberalism too far. Rather than springing from generic features of a neoliberal state that is seen as comprehensively engaged in a coercive privatization of social reproduction, civic integration policies, as we have seen, are not all of a piece. The different contours of these policies in different states also reflect something other than statist variables — the left-right balance of the political forces or the demographic profile of migrants, among other possibilities. In Europe, the Netherlands, pressured by a uniquely strong populist movement, went further than other European states in expanding the repressive dimension of civic integration; in other states, such as Germany, the obligatory thrust of this
policy exists on paper only, and in reality it bears more resemblance to remedial settlement aids for newcomers. Moreover, only in the Netherlands did the entire policy become truly privatized, as neoliberalism would have it, by making the migrant fully responsible and paying for her integration. By contrast, in France there was no question that in instituting integration policy, the state had to retain its traditional role in guaranteeing national unity. The contractual element of civic integration even permitted the policy to be associated with a rejuvenation of French republicanism; the attempt to push the obligatory and repressive side of the policy has therefore been weaker (though eventually not unsuccessful).

If we ask why civic integration in Canada, practised since 1950 under the blander guise of settlement programs (Bloemraad 2005), has retained its entirely optional aspect while in Europe it has been marked by a repressive tone, the plausible answer draws us even further away from political or state-related variables. While an explanation can only be hinted at here, an important role must be attributed to the different demographic and sociological profiles of migrants to Canada and Europe. Canada predominantly selects highly skilled and resourceful immigrants, which naturally eases their adjustment. The majority of migrants to Europe, by contrast, are not selected at all but enter on the basis of rights, either family or refugee rights. Because a majority of these migrants are unskilled and (with the exception of those entering France) not proficient in the language of the receiving society, and since they often become immediately dependent on welfare, they face serious adjustment problems. The obligatory and repressive dimension of civic integration in Europe cannot be uncoupled from the unselected status of most of its migrants.

The comparison of civic integration policies in the Netherlands, France and Germany reveals significant divergence in their respective national interpretations and implementations. Does this confirm the persistence of national models of integration and thus refute the central claim of this chapter? Unsurprisingly, the answer must be no. Most of the observed variations run counter to what the national models (or, rather, the accumulated stereotypes of a given country and its policy) would predict. The multicultural Netherlands adopted the most repressive variant of civic integration. Republican France, where the degree of articulation of its philosophy of integration is without parallel in the world, now submits to Rawlsian political liberalism, while its pragmatic stress on the principle of “becoming rapidly autonomous” betrays an acceptance of the otherwise
descised tenets of neoliberalism (HCI 2001, 49). And segregationist Germany has adopted the mellowest, least control-minded, most “Canadian” variant of civic integration. Overall, the withering of national models of immigrant integration in western Europe is unsurprising, because if anywhere, this is the part of the world in which neatly bounded nation-states no longer exist.
Notes

1. To avoid engaging in the academic blame game, I will not cite some of the earlier formulations. The most sophisticated contemporary formulation, which responds to some of the shortcomings of older approaches, and which operates with four instead of three possibilities, is Koopmans et al. (2005, chapter 2).

2. "In democratic republics, the State has no vocation to impose values, because it grants its citizens the liberty to choose them."

3. "Integration is: 'I welcome you as you are to the republican melting pot.' Assimilation is: 'I will make you disappear.'"

4. In EU jargon, this is the "Lisbon Strategy" (as if any strategy could ever achieve that much), and it was formulated at the EU Lisbon summit in March 2000.

5. Such soft integration has now been put to the service of legal integration in terms of the "open method of coordination" enunciated in the European Commission's 2001 European Governance: A White Paper.

6. Other common basic principles of integration policy not further discussed here are education, intercultural dialogue, political participation (especially at the local level), the mainstreaming of integration policies in other policy portfolios and the development of better indicators and evaluation mechanisms.

7. The motif of incremental rights is also invoked in the European Commission's communication to the council of June 3, 2003, which laid the ground for the November 2004 council conclusions on common principles of European integration policy (European Commission 2003, 5).

8. EU migrants are exempted through European Community law (because it would constitute discrimination on the basis of nationality), and the citizens of most developed OECD countries (such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) are exempted through bilateral treaties.

9. "Knowledge of the French language and the principles that govern the French Republic."

10. "What we want is to oblige the person who sponsors another person, generally a wife, within the family regrouping framework, to permit that person to learn French and to fit into our society."

11. "No matter how these methods sometimes function in other countries, we must not sever our living bond with the heritage of republican integration." Close to Chirac, Kriegel is clearly the rearguard of French immigration reform, in contrast to previous presidents of the HCI.

12. "Civic integration must respect the identity of the individual and be differentiated from assimilation"; "teaching new arrivals the common law...otherwise known as the Constitution."

References


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